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Introduction 
  
Within the vast body of scholarship on the Second World War, some of the most ground-
breaking research in recent years has explored the complex relationships between Germans and 
the peoples they conquered.  While European historians have traditionally focused on national 
resistance movements during the war, the topic of collaboration with the Nazi regime has remained 
controversial.  This thesis tackles this contentious subject by examining the relationship between 
the French and German press industries, using the history of a German propaganda publication, 
Signal magazine, as a case study.  
 
Signal magazine first came to my attention in late 2015 as I leafed through a collection of 
vintage publications from the Second World War.  One publication in particular caught my atten-
tion: a thick magazine full of glossy pages and bright, Kodachrome photographs.  Despite its print-
ing during wartime, the magazine was of outstanding quality.  I read through its articles on 
women’s fashion and the latest developments in aircraft design.  I followed its updates on the 
progress of the war.  I admired its photographs of warfare and civilian life, wondering how the 
magazine had managed to obtain such high-quality photographs from occupied-Paris and the East-
ern Front.  An article casting the German war effort in a positive light, however, brought the sudden 
realization that I was reading German propaganda and that those Kodachrome photographs that I 
had admired were, in fact, Agfacolor. 
Signal magazine was unlike any German propaganda I had seen before. It was subtle in its 
messaging, nuanced, and lacked the kind of hysterical and impassioned rants against Bolsheviks 
and Jews typical of other Nazi publications.  It was stylized in the form of popular American 
magazines like Life and Time.  And, of course, it was written in English – not the awkwardly-
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constructed English of a second-rate translator, but the kind of English one might expect from an 
American or British author, full of eloquence and flair.  The magazine was targeted at an audience 
outside the borders of the German Reich, deviating greatly from the domestic Nazi propaganda 
that historians have grown accustomed to seeing.  Intrigued by my discovery, I searched online for 
more information on the magazine.   
Signal was a photojournalism magazine published by the German Wehrmacht between 
April 1940 and April 1945.  Composed in Berlin and printed by local publishing houses throughout 
Europe, the magazine relied on collaborative networks between Germans and other Europeans.  
While many historians have recognized Signal for its rare, wartime color photographs, few have 
ever studied the history or written content of the magazine.  As I quickly discovered during my 
preliminary research, the scholarship on Signal’s history is surprisingly sparse: only a handful of 
articles (most in French and German) have ever been written. English scholarship in particular is 
virtually non-existent. 
During the spring semester of 2016, I researched the magazine in an honors research sem-
inar with Professor Alice Conklin from the Department of History. Using a near-complete run of 
the French edition of Signal housed at Ohio State’s Rare Books and Manuscripts Library,1 as well 
as issues from the English edition digitized online by the University of Chicago, I studied the 
political content of the magazine. In particular, I focused on how Signal’s message, aimed at a 
wider European audience, differed from that of domestic German propaganda, which was pub-
lished within Germany for a specifically German audience. The central theme during the maga-
zine’s five-year run was the New Order being constructed by Nazi Germany, a project which, 
                                                          
1 “World War II Periodicals Collection of Hugh A. Harter, ca. 1939-1945.” This collection contains French periodi-
cals collected by Dr. Hugh Harter during his military service in France in 1944. Dr. Harter received his PhD from 
Ohio State in 1959 and later served as Professor of Romance Languages at Ohio Wesleyan University. Before his 
passing in 2011, Dr. Harter generously donated his collection to Ohio State’s Rare Books and Manuscripts Library. 
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Signal argued, would reverse the decline of European civilization.  My research found significant 
contradictions between the magazine’s argument for a German-led “European Community” and 
arguments in domestic propaganda for a German-dominated Europe.2, 3 
These findings raised important questions concerning the material conditions of the maga-
zine’s creation and led me to expand my term paper into a year-long thesis project with Professor 
Conklin as my advisor.  Considering the unique political message espoused by Signal, I was espe-
cially interested in researching the motivations and ideological underpinnings of Signal’s editors, 
contributors, and publishers – some of whom were not German, but instead citizens of occupied 
countries such as France, Belgium, and Norway.  Of immediate concern, however, were the Ger-
mans themselves, and more specifically, the editors who shaped the magazine’s message of com-
munity and cooperation between Europeans. 
In the autumn of 2016, I began research on two of the leading personalities at Signal: Max 
Clauss, a scholar who joined the editorial staff in 1940, and Giselher Wirsing, a respected German 
journalist who became chief editor in 1943.  My primary goal was to determine the political views 
of these two personalities, what sympathies they held with Nazi ideology more broadly, and what 
effect these views had on the content of the magazine.  This part of my research relied upon sec-
ondary material on the German press during the Weimar and Nazi eras, as well as English-trans-
lations of various primary sources, such as personal correspondence and several books published 
by Clauss and Wirsing, both before and after the Nazi seizure of power. 
In October of 2016, funding from Danone North America allowed me to travel to the U.S. 
National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), located in College Park, Maryland.  
There, I uncovered dozens of U.S. intelligence reports on Giselher Wirsing as well as interrogation 
                                                          
2 The bulk of my preliminary research for Professor Conklin’s seminar makes up the second chapter of this thesis. 
3 All translations from French to English in this paper are my own. 
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records from 1945 and 1946, conducted immediately following the Allied-occupation of Germany.  
These records provided crucial insights into Wirsing’s writing career, his political views, and his 
post-war reflections on the Nazi era.  Also of interest at NARA were external audits of Signal’s 
publisher in Berlin, OSS intelligence reports on the European public’s reception of Signal, and 
internal documents from the U.S. Office of War Information (OWI) formulating ways in which 
U.S. propaganda could respond to Signal’s anti-American rhetoric. 
In the spring of 2017, I shifted my focus away from the Germans in Berlin to the French-
men working for the magazine in Paris.  My research on these French “collaborators” faced a 
number of challenges, the most significant being the lack of English scholarship on Signal maga-
zine and on collaborationist press more broadly. As such, I had to lay extensive groundwork and 
rely heavily on French primary documents. Through this research, my goal was to answer several 
pressing questions: Why did so many figures in the French press choose to collaborate with their 
nation’s conquerors? Where on the political spectrum – between “committed ideologue” and “op-
portunist” – did these men fall? How did the publishing process for Signal work, and, more im-
portantly, how were French collaborators incorporated into that process? Finally, was “collabora-
tion” too broad a term for the French who worked for Signal? 
I was fortunate enough to receive two undergraduate and international research grants from 
the College of Arts and Sciences at Ohio State, which allowed me to continue my research for two 
weeks in Paris in January of 2017.  There, at the Archives nationales, I located and analyzed orig-
inal documents related to Signal.  Of particular interest at the archives were legal records. Follow-
ing the Allied liberation of France in 1944, the French provisional government conducted épura-
tion (purge) trials, which sought to rid French society of the collaborators who had betrayed their 
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nation.  Among those put on trial was André Zucca, a photographer who worked as the Paris cor-
respondent for Signal from 1941 to 1944. The Archives contained records of his investigation and 
trial, as well as original documents related to his employment with the Germans. 
It was through my research on Zucca and inquiries into German-occupation records that I 
was able to uncover the French publishing house in charge of printing Signal – Imprimerie Georges 
Lang.  This ultimately led me to back to the épuration collection at the archives, which contained 
a massive dossier on the publishing house’s Jewish owner, Georges Lang, as well as his business’ 
board of directors, all of whom were accused of collaboration with the Germans after the liberation.  
Transcripts from their May 1946 trial put the psychology of Lang, his associates, and their accusers 
on full display, offering fascinating insights into where the French drew the line between right and 
wrong during one of the darkest periods in their country’s history. 
Secondary sources were still important in my research on the French. A number of works 
have been published in French on the press industry in Paris during the war years, which was 
critical in reconstructing the world in which Signal operated. Using these writings in conjunction 
with archival material, I was able to piece together Signal’s history in Paris. 
 
Beyond analyzing the French archival documents, one of the most frustrating aspects of 
this ambitious project has been organizing and synthesizing the research: How does the historian 
construct a coherent narrative when so much of the information collected seems tangential and, at 
times, contradictory?  Fortunately, discussions with Professor Conklin and Professor David Stei-
gerwald from the Department of History have greatly benefitted my understanding of the research.   
After much consideration, it seemed only natural to organize my research in the same man-
ner as I had originally conducted it.  The first half of this thesis examines the creation of Signal 
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and its underlying political message.  The second half focuses on the Germans and French who 
contributed to the magazine, examining how they contributed to Signal’s message and how pro-
fessional “collaboration” manifested itself in Germany and France. 
In chapter one, I trace the transformation of Nazi propaganda from peacetime to wartime 
and explain how the creation of Signal magazine grew out of efforts to socialize and co-opt Eu-
rope’s occupied-peoples into the New Order.  Throughout the chapter, I discuss the material con-
ditions of the magazine’s publication, distribution, and its reception in Europe and abroad. 
In chapter two, I examine the political content of Signal and its transformation from 1940 
to 1945.  While the magazine attempted to remain apolitical in its early years, it increasingly played 
on deeply-held European fears of societal decline.  To this aim, Signal portrayed Germany as a 
benevolent hegemon working to rescue Europe.  The magazine sought to present the New Order 
not as an aggressive effort at German conquest, but as a German-led, pan-European project. 
In chapter three, I focus on Max Clauss and Giselher Wirsing, two German editors whose 
political views shaped much of the magazine’s content.  Both men were ideological conservatives 
who, throughout their careers, envisioned Germany as the leader of a future pan-European move-
ment.  This fact, of course, raises important questions surrounding German “collaboration,” if one 
can call it that: as with nearly all German conservatives following Hitler’s rise, both men made 
concessions to the Nazi regime.  Clauss and Wirsing strived to reconcile their political disagree-
ments with Nazism, a reconciliation that proved surprisingly easy for them even as they held on to 
the delusion of European unification.  Tracing their careers – from conservative idealists to Nazi 
apologists – I conclude that, despite their serious misgivings about Nazism’s more violent im-
pulses, both men legitimized Hitler’s regime through their work for Signal. 
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In chapter four, I examine the careers of André Zucca and Georges Lang, two Frenchmen 
who collaborated in the production of Signal between 1940 and 1944.  Both men, dedicated and 
successful professionals before the war, found themselves suddenly confronted with the German-
occupation of their country and the prospect of lost livelihoods.  Rather than accepting personal 
ruin, however, Zucca and Lang agreed to conditions set by the Germans in working for Signal 
magazine.  This chapter will focus especially on the unique circumstances faced by the French 
who, more than any other occupied country, had the privilege of choosing between collaboration, 
accommodation, and resistance. 
The personal stories of the Germans and Frenchmen who collaborated on Signal magazine 
are weaved together by a common thread: a seeming ambivalence toward the Nazi regime.  What-
ever their personal reservations, however, all four men agreed to work with the Nazis in some 
capacity.  In each case, personal reservations on Nazism were overcome by a desire to continue 
professional and political endeavors uninhibited.  In the case of the Germans more specifically, 
collaboration meant the acceptance of Nazism and all its crimes. 
This thesis project not only adds much-needed scholarship on an oft-overlooked example 
of war propaganda, but on broader historical questions as well. Considering the nature of Signal’s 
political message and its publication, printed in publishing houses all over Europe, my research 
helps answer the “why?” and “how?” questions surrounding professional “collaboration” during 
the Second World War.  More importantly, it sheds light on how specific groups of Europeans 
viewed their place within the Nazi New Order, and raises intriguing questions concerning the re-
lationship between wartime conceptions of “Europe” and postwar European integration. 
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Chapter 1: “A Magazine for the New Order” 
 
“Today the crafty men who cast the Axis line from Singapore to 
Valparaiso are far ahead of the U.S. They have talent, experience, 
almost unlimited funds and no compunctions about honesty. In 18 
languages, they spread their lies, fomenting hatred against the 
United Nations, scoffing at our war aims and our leaders. The dead-
liest weapon in the vast Axis propaganda arsenal is Signal.”4 
 
        – Life magazine editorial 
           March 22, 1943 
 
One of the most important lessons the Nazis took from Germany’s defeat in the First World 
War was the dismal state of German propaganda in 1914-18.  While Allied propaganda had de-
nounced German atrocities in Belgium and mobilized public support for the war effort against the 
German “Huns,” no comparable media campaign was ever launched by the Kaiser’s propagan-
dists.5  “Never again” was Hitler’s sentiment.  Military struggle, he fervently believed, could not 
be won without a simultaneous ideological struggle over hearts and minds.  It is fitting to note 
here, then, the stark contrasts between the First and Second World Wars: while the First had begun 
with an actual crime – the assassination of Franz Ferdinand – the casus belli for the Second was a 
fictional, propaganda event – the staging of a Polish attack on the German radio-transmitter at 
Gleiwitz, which heralded the German invasion of Poland in 1939.6  The Nazis were clearly masters 
of propaganda, making it into an art form.  It is partly for this reason that the once neutral term 
“propaganda” has since become tinged as a derogatory word synonymous with misinformation 
and deceit. 
                                                          
4 “U.S. is Losing the War of Words.” Life, March 22, 1943, p.14-15. 
5 Susan Bachrach et al., State of Deception: The Power of Nazi Propaganda, p.101. 
6 Margaret Wagner et al., The Library of Congress World War II Companion, p.783. 
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In its most rudimentary definition, propaganda simply means the dissemination of infor-
mation, usually with the purpose of persuading a group of people “about the virtues of some or-
ganization, cause, or person.” Its effectiveness is judged on its ability to encapsulate and channel 
strong public sentiments. 7  The basic logic of propaganda is straightforward: only by empowering 
supporters, neutralizing antagonists, and winning over the hearts and minds of the indifferent can 
a political group elicit the public responses and actions it desires.8 
The National Socialist Revolution that followed Hitler’s appointment as Chancellor of Ger-
many in 1933 was indeed a revolution; all aspects of German society – culture, literature, art, 
religion, science – were radically altered in the image of the Nazi worldview.  Of course, violent 
change from above is always accompanied by forms of public resistance from below.  Even before 
their ascent to power, therefore, Nazi propagandists under the leadership of Joseph Goebbels 
worked to preempt such resistance.  The power of Nazi propaganda lay in its ability to capture the 
public’s disillusionment with the Weimar Republic (and liberal democracy more broadly).  Within 
a matter of years, the Nazis had won over millions of supporters with their appeals to public hopes 
– the promise of a utopian volksgemeinschaft, or people’s community, led by the Führer – as well 
as public fears – the “international Jewish conspiracy” that threatened the volksgemeinschaft.9   
By the start of the war in 1939, all the instruments of the Nazi propaganda machine were 
largely in place, including “propaganda organizations, censorship mechanisms, news distribution 
systems, and [state] control of media and the arts.”10  There were two main bodies in particular 
that oversaw propaganda and censorship in the Third Reich: the Ministry of People’s Enlighten-
ment and Propaganda (RMVP) and the Reich Chamber of Culture (RKK).  At the head of the 
                                                          
7 Robert Jackall, “Introduction,” Propaganda, p.2. 
8 Harold Lasswell, “Propaganda,” Propaganda, p.18. 
9 Susan Bachrach et al., State of Deception: The Power of Nazi Propaganda, p.1, 75. 
10 Margaret Wagner et al., The Library of Congress World War II Companion, p.784. 
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propaganda apparatus was Joseph Goebbels, an early member of the National Socialist Party and 
close confidant of Hitler.  As head Minister of the RMVP, he controlled and supervised virtually 
all media in Germany, from radio and film to art and literature.11  Whereas the goal of Goebbels’ 
propaganda apparatus before 1939 had been to build the volksgemeinschaft and consolidate Nazi 
rule in Germany, the goal after was to prepare the German people for a racial war for survival.  
During the Second World War, therefore, the major theme of propaganda shifted from community 
to struggle, which emphasized “the importance of patriotism, the necessity of sacrifice, and the 
imperative to become a soldier.”12 
With rapid military victories and conquests, however, came a new problem for the Nazi 
regime: Germany now found millions of non-German Europeans under its control.  Of course, 
these enemy populations could be subdued through a combination of brute force and terror (which 
was the primary form of German power encountered by occupied populations during the war, 
particularly in the East), but propagandists and ideologues, both within the Nazi party and without, 
understood the importance of minimizing resistance through psychological manipulation as well.  
With the help of propaganda, they hoped, occupied populations could not only be beaten into sub-
mission, but converted into useful tools for the German war effort (thereby diminishing the need 
for coercion).  As John Ikenberry, an international theorist at Princeton University, explains, small 
states are most susceptible to outside political influence in the aftermath of war.  When a new 
hegemon arises (in this case, Nazi Germany), its ultimate goal is to redefine the international order.  
The new hegemon must articulate new international norms and instill those norms in other states, 
a process he terms “socialization.”  This socialization legitimates the status of the new hegemon 
                                                          
11 Margaret Wagner et al., The Library of Congress World War II Companion, p.787-789. 
12 Ibid., p.787. 
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and redefines the status-quo.13  The term socialization implies control over mass society, in areas 
such as education and family life, but, in the case of Nazi Germany, socialization was limited 
specifically to the control of political elites.14  It should be noted, therefore, that the Nazi regime 
never fully controlled – nor wanted to control – the daily lives and social practices of the peoples 
it occupied, especially in Western Europe; the Nazis’ major concern in the West was earning the 
allegiance of the state, which meant earning the allegiance of local political elites.  In the case of 
France, for example, the Nazi cause was met largely with apathy among the popular masses rather 
than enthusiasm, yet Germany managed to squeeze a vast amount of foodstuffs, raw materials, and 
human labor out of France – all thanks to the collaboration of France’s political elites: traditional-
ists, fascists, and technocrats.15 
As Ikenberry points out, however, a hegemon’s control over elites might guarantee its con-
trol over the state, but it cannot guarantee secure control; the passively accommodating masses 
can quickly become the actively resisting masses.  In the case of British colonial rule in India, it 
was important that British values flowed down not just to the local elites, but to the popular masses 
as well.  In areas where this failed to occur, the stability of British rule was quite precarious.16  
This lesson was not lost on German propagandists in the early years of the Second World War.  
Even in the hubris of German victory in 1940 and the establishment of local governments cooper-
ative with Germany, many Nazi ideologues saw the necessity for the Nazi propaganda apparatus 
to extend outside Germany’s borders into the occupied countries. 
 
                                                          
13 John Ikenberry, “Socialization and Hegemonic Power,” International Organization, p.283. 
14 Ibid., p.293. 
15 Robert Paxton, Vichy France: Old Guard, New Order, p.234-241. 
16 John Ikenberry, “Socialization and Hegemonic Power,” International Organization, p.314. 
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In the autumn of 1939, the Division for Defense Propaganda (a division of the Wehrmacht) 
hired the services of Heinrich Hunke, an economist, and Major Fritz Solm, a marketing specialist, 
to develop a propaganda publication targeted at the occupied peoples.  Solm had received his ed-
ucation at Columbia University and spent the 1920s working for a New York advertising agency.17  
It was Solm’s suggestion to produce a European version of the American Life magazine, an idea 
that quickly caught on with the Wehrmacht; photojournalism magazines had grown significantly 
in popularity throughout the 1920s and 1930s, both in the United States and in Western Europe, 
presenting a kind of “documentary theater” not seen in other forms of print media.18  Taking advice 
from the prominent journalist and foreign policy expert Giselher Wirsing, the team centralized the 
magazine’s message around the “New Order.”  Following Signal’s inception, the Wehrmacht hired 
an elite group of prominent journalists, war reporters, foreign policy experts, and photographers 
to contribute articles for Signal. 
Despite being written and edited by Wehrmacht staff, the printing of Signal was contracted 
through a private publisher in Berlin, Deutscher Verlag.  Founded in 1877 by a Jewish business-
man, Deutscher Verlag’s name before the Nazi era had been Ullstein Verlag.  In the 1920s, Ullstein 
Verlag had grown from a humble family business into a press empire, publishing a number of 
successful papers such as Tempo and BZ am Mittag. Despite being a Jewish-owned business, 
Ullstein Verlag was exempt from the Nazi boycotts of 1933, largely because the Nazis feared that 
hurting such a large company could put hundreds of Aryan employees out of work.  In 1934, the 
head of the Reich Press Chamber “bought out” the Ullstein empire, and in 1937, renamed it 
Deutscher Verlag.19  Deutscher Verlag remained one of the major publishing houses in Germany 
                                                          
17 Pamela Swett, “Preparing for Victory: Heinrich Hunke, the Nazi Werberat, and West German Prosperity.” Central 
European History, p.700-702. 
18 Claude Bellanger, Histoire générale de la presse française, tome 4: De 1940 à 1958, p.59. 
19 Richard J. Evans, The Coming of the Third Reich, p.120; 436. 
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throughout the Nazi era and continued to grow, employing over 8,000 workers in management, 
printing, and distribution by 1940.20  That same year, the Wehrmacht signed a contract with the 
company to print and distribute Signal, a contract the company eagerly accepted due to the maga-
zine’s heavy subsidization by the state.  In addition, the contract also assigned the foreign depart-
ment at Deutscher Verlag the task of translating Signal from its original German into other Euro-
pean languages, a task that required a team of over a hundred translators.21 
In April 1940, the first issue of Signal hit newsstands across Europe, both in occupied and 
neutral countries.  Although, initially, the magazine’s distribution had been handled exclusively 
by Deutscher Verlag,22 Germany’s successive military victories expanded the production needs 
for Signal beyond its publisher’s capabilities: at its height in 1943, Signal magazine was published 
in over twenty languages and had a circulation of over two and a half million copies, making it the 
most widely circulated publication in Europe during the Second World War.23  In 1941, Deutscher 
Verlag was forced to decentralize its operations, contracting out much of its work to publishing 
houses in Oslo, Paris, and Milan.24  Both the English and French editions of Signal (which this 
thesis examines) were printed in Paris.   
As a propaganda tool, Signal appealed to its readers with a colorful, sleek and modern 
design, styled after the American-published Life magazine, as well as an affordable cost at ten 
cents, the same as Life.25 Signal is best remembered today by historians for its abundance of glossy, 
                                                          
20 Deutscher Verlag, 1944-1947. Office of Military Government for Germany: Records of the Information Control 
Division, Box 175. Records of United States Occupation Headquarters, World War II, Record Group 498. NARA, 
College Park, MD. 
21 Aurianne Cox, “Le journal Signal : Presse illustrée et propagande allemande en France.” Culture et médias sous 
l’Occupation : Des entreprises dans la France de Vichy, p.194. 
22 Margaret Wagner et al., The Library of Congress World War II Companion, p.802-803. 
23 Michael Balfour, Propaganda in War, 1939-1945, p.105.; for comparison, the Völkischer Beobachter, an official 
organ of the Nazi party, never reached a total circulation higher than 1.8 million copies. 
24 Aurianne Cox, “Le journal Signal : Presse illustrée et propagande allemande en France.” Culture et médias sous 
l’Occupation : Des entreprises dans la France de Vichy, p.193. 
25 0.10 USD in 1940 would be equivalent to 1.73 USD in 2017. 
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full-page color photographs (a rarity in the early 1940s). The ultimate goal of the magazine’s edi-
torials and photo-essays was twofold: to convince the occupied peoples of Germany’s goodwill 
and to persuade them to support the German cause. 
Considering the subjective nature of such a task, it is, of course, impossible to measure the 
precise effectiveness of Signal as a propaganda tool.  It is possible, however, to gain a sense of the 
magazine’s reception among European publics.  The journalist Claude Bellanger recognized Sig-
nal for having “perhaps the best technical presentation” of any publication in occupied France, 
“although it appeared too clearly as a magazine of the Wehrmacht.”  For this reason, Signal was 
met with significant hostility in the south of France, where resistance members staged attacks on 
kiosk owners selling the magazine in Lyon and Nice.  Frightened by the attacks, many French 
newspaper merchants simply refused to carry the magazine, an act of defiance that prompted a 
blustery response from the German embassy in Vichy: all French kiosk owners were ordered to 
“display Signal in a very visible way” under the threat of having their licenses revoked.26  The 
magazine did, however, enjoy more success in the north of France.  As one German businessman 
observed, many Parisians had distaste for German newspapers, but still bought Signal.  This was 
attributed to the “curiosity of the passerby” –  Parisians were enticed by Signal’s broad content, its 
high production value, and their own simple eagerness to read.27  An OSS intelligence report from 
September 1942 noted that, while most Europeans distrusted the Germans, they still relied heavily 
on German news to keep up with the progress of the war.28  Signal succeeded not so much in 
                                                          
26 Claude Bellanger, Histoire générale de la presse française, tome 4: De 1940 à 1958, p.12. 
27 Archives nationales de France, 72AJ/1885/archives d’Alfons Geubels. 
28 Anglo-American Propaganda Progress in France, 23 September 1942. Military Intelligence Division Regional 
File, 1922-1944, France, Box 805. Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs, Record Group 165. 
NARA, College Park, MD. 
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winning over Europeans to the German cause as it did in fueling European doubt and distrust of 
the Allies.29 
Signal’s message was not aimed solely at occupied peoples, however.  The magazine 
proved itself a nuisance even in countries outside of Hitler’s New Order – a testament to its wide 
distribution.  As early as November 1940, the magazine was causing a stir in neutral Turkey, where 
anti-German sentiment was on the rise due to Germany’s alliance with Bulgaria.  A New York 
Times article describes various efforts to halt Signal’s distribution in Turkey, including violent 
student protests and threats from the Turkish Association of Newspaper Proprietors to revoke the 
licenses of kiosk owners selling the magazine.30  On the opposite side of Europe, English editions 
of Signal were being sent from France through neutral Ireland and into the United States for sale.  
As late as 1943, content from the magazine was still being reproduced in American newspapers, 
including the Cleveland Plain Dealer.31  In a March 1943 article from Life magazine, U.S. mem-
bers of Congress lamented the poor state of America’s propaganda in comparison to Germany’s, 
singling out Signal magazine as the greatest propaganda publication in Europe.  “The deadliest 
weapon in the vast Axis propaganda arsenal,” the article’s author wrote, “is Signal.”  The author’s 
criticism of American efforts was scathing, disparaging American propaganda as merely a “pallid 
imitation” of Signal and claiming that the American magazine Victory had only half the distribu-
tion.32  Certainly, the magazine caused a stir wherever German agents managed to distribute it, 
drawing the ire of political leaders in countries as far away as Turkey and the United States.   
                                                          
29 Long-Range Plan for Belgium (11 November 1944), Projection of America. Policy Directives, Records of the 
New York Office Bureau of Overseas Publications, Box 808. Office of War Information, Record Group 208. 
NARA, College Park, MD. 
30 G. D. R. Gedye, “Reich Envoy Seeks Turkish President,” New York Times, November 30, 1940. 
31 Walton W. Rankin, “Victory in Tunis Vindicates Belief that Spirit of Free Man is Unconquerable.” Plain Dealer, 
May 16, 1943. 
32  “U.S. is Losing the War of Words.” Life, March 22, 1943, p.11, 15. ; Victory magazine was produced by the U.S. 
Office of War Information (OWI) during the war.  Like Signal, Victory was published in multiple languages and was 
distributed in foreign nations (including in Europe) to persuade others of the virtues of the American war effort. 
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Despite its relative independence from the authority of the RMVP, the magazine’s provoc-
ative content drew on many of the same principles adhered to by Joseph Goebbels.  Goebbels 
believed that propaganda, especially when directed at potentially hostile populations, should not 
be overly forceful in its opinions.  Instead, the most effective propaganda should provide a mix of 
leisurely entertainment as well as suggestive messaging.33  This principle is reflected in Signal, 
which, until the latter half of the war, contained few overtly political editorials, instead focusing 
on grandiose depictions of battle and light-hearted, seemingly innocuous articles on art, literature, 
and film.  In Germany, Goebbels also strove to use the “truth” as frequently as possible, to boost 
the credibility of German propaganda.  “Lies,” Goebbels explained, were only useful “when they 
could not be disproved.”34  Again, the editors of Signal largely adhered to this principle, choosing 
simply to omit facts about German defeat rather than publishing lies about German victory.  Ex-
tending Goebbels’ truth principle, for example, Signal reproduced material from enemy publica-
tions (The New York Times, Reader’s Digest, and Collier’s magazine) to lend credibility to its 
articles on the horrors of life inside the United States.35  
As David Welch, a noted scholar of propaganda, once wrote, examining propaganda “sheds 
important light on the Nazi mentality.”36  In the case of Signal, it reveals the ways in which the 
Nazis tried to alter the mentalities of other Europeans; to understand how the magazine made its 
case to the occupied peoples, this paper now turns to the contents and transformation of the mag-
azine, from April 1940 to its end in 1945. 
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Chapter 2: The Myth of the European Community 
 
“We Europeans sense a deeper meaning in this war, our war of uni-
fication. We can already see our fractured Continent advancing to-
ward a social future as a community.”37 
 
  –  Dr. Giselher Wirsing, April 1943 
                                                      chief editor for Signal magazine 
 
 
Over the course of its five-year run, the central challenge for Signal was convincing Euro-
peans that they had not truly been conquered, but instead rescued by Nazi Germany from decline 
and irrelevance.  In exploiting the strong sense of national decay among Europe’s occupied peo-
ples, the authors emphasized the need for Germany to rise up as Europe’s new hegemon.  As this 
chapter will attempt to demonstrate, Signal supported this message by appealing both to hope – 
Germany the benevolent leader and model society – as well as to fear – Americans and Soviets, 
the usurpers of Europe’s mantle. 
 
In May 1941, a headline in Signal blasted out, “Two Balkan countries have given their 
decision!”  Spring 1941 had witnessed the spectacular German campaign through the Balkans, as 
the Wehrmacht easily defeated both Yugoslavia and Greece and banished the British from the 
European continent.  In the article, photographs depict Bulgarian and Yugoslav citizens celebrating 
the arrival of German troops in the Balkans.  One striking scene captures Bulgarian women danc-
ing in their traditional national dress while jubilant German soldiers look on.  As the reader turns 
the page, however, this happy scene is shattered by photographs of the horrific bombing and de-
struction of Belgrade.  Despite Yugoslavia’s original assurances to Hitler, the government had 
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been overthrown by usurpers who rejected German overtures.  According to the magazine, the new 
government in Belgrade was betraying the will of the Yugoslav people and accepting British in-
fluence in Europe.  Clearly, such resistance to Germany could not be tolerated, and Signal proudly 
displayed the destruction rained down on the Yugoslav capital by Stuka dive bombers.  The mag-
azine still took time to save face for the Wehrmacht, assuring its readers that the Luftwaffe had 
only targeted “les objectifs militaires.”38 
The first two years of Signal’s existence was, in many ways, a fitting reflection of the war’s 
progression, as German forces fought from victory to victory.  The magazine’s central message 
during the early years of 1940 and 1941 was two-fold (and seemingly contradictory).  On the one 
hand, the message was threatening:  German victory was certain, and any resistance to the German 
master was an exercise in futility – as the fate of Belgrade had proven.  On the other hand, the 
message was reassuring: German soldiers were friendly and humane, sparing Europeans the terror 
and destruction waged by the Allies.  The compromise between these two conflicting images could 
be found in articles such as the one aforementioned on Yugoslavia.  Issues of the magazine from 
1940 are full of images of bombed-out cities like Rotterdam and Warsaw.  As in the case of Bel-
grade, the terror bombing of Rotterdam is depicted as a regrettable but necessary act to cut down 
“all resistance.”39  While there is much to be said regarding the falsehood of such claims made by 
Signal, the day-to-day narrative of the war presented in the magazine is, for the most part, accurate 
and “honest.”  The rapid conquests of 1940 and 1941 gave German propagandists little reason to 
falsify the general progression of the war, especially in the West.  Articles on the German invasion 
of Norway, for example, depict the conflict as a preventative measure against the British seizure 
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of Norwegian ports and resources – a point that was largely true, and supported Germany’s claims 
of protecting Europe.40 
As Germany encountered its first serious setbacks in late 1941, Signal was quick to down-
play such problems and diverted responsibility away from the failures the Wehrmacht.  Images 
from 1941, for example, depict German panzers bogged down in the rain and mud of the Russian 
rasputitsa, blaming the slowing of the German advance on spontaneous, unpredictable weather 
rather than Germany’s own poor logistical planning.41  As the war turned decisively against the 
Germans in 1943, however, simplistic explanations would not suffice.  Signal could not ignore the 
momentous German defeat at Stalingrad, and the magazine’s editors worked around this problem 
by spinning the defeat as a tactical sacrifice on the part of the German Sixth Army; the defeat, they 
claimed, was an intentional action to buy time for Germany’s frontline troops behind the Stalingrad 
pocket.42  In most cases, however, Signal chose simply to ignore defeat.  The German retreat in 
North Africa received scant coverage, and the presence of German troops in Tunisia in 1943 was 
depicted only briefly, without any explanation of the long retreat from Egypt that had preceded 
it.43  Over time, the magazine’s emphasis on the war effort decreased as a greater number of articles 
focused on the goal of European unity and collaboration with Germany.  Even though it maintained 
an optimistic picture of German-occupied Europe throughout the war, the shift in content – from 
stories of German victory to warnings of imminent European decline – created a sense of desper-
ation in the magazine’s overall message; as the Nazis grew evermore aware their own vulnerabil-
ity, Signal could no longer rely on simply cowing Europeans into submission with images of Ger-
man victory and retribution.  It would increasingly attempt to rally Europeans to the war effort, 
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focusing on the hopes of European unity under German hegemony and, more importantly, on the 
enemies now threatening Europe – reminiscent of pre-war propaganda on the volksgemeinschaft 
and the “international conspiracy” against it. 
Volksgemeinschaft, as explained earlier in this thesis, was an important theme in Nazi prop-
aganda before the war.  In building a community of the people, the Nazis strove to throw off the 
old aristocratic order that had governed before 1918 and attempted to remold the German people 
under National Socialist ideology, preparing the newly “Nazified masses” for war.44  Populist and 
egalitarian rhetoric, therefore, was a useful tool in taming the proletariat, giving Germans from 
every walk of life a sense of unity within a single, racialized “people’s community.”45  The effec-
tiveness of such propaganda was not lost on the editors of Signal.  Drawing on the general percep-
tion of European decline and prewar calls for European integration, the magazine’s editors ex-
panded upon the idea of “people’s community” to suggest the building of a “European Commu-
nity.”46  Many of Signal’s political articles were tied together by the common thread of European 
decline and the need for a new hegemon at the heart of Europe to unite the continent – Germany.47 
In 1940 already, Signal was drawing comparisons between Hitler and Napoleon, as both 
men had united the continent through conquest.  Hitler was inherently different, though, in that he 
was not fighting simply for his nation (Germany), but for the sovereignty of all nations.48  He was, 
in a sense, uniting the entire European continent into a single community.  For centuries, the mag-
azine laments, Europe had ripped itself apart in “fratricidal civil wars” and greatly weakened its 
global standing.  With the new German hegemon, however, “[civil] war” had been banished from 
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the continent, allowing the nations of Europe to cooperate with one another once more, as they 
had under the Roman Empire.  Only through German hegemony could Europe gain economic 
autarky, freeing itself from the threat of British blockade and outside ideological influence.49  Ger-
many was a prosperous and powerful nation located at the heart of the continent and, therefore, in 
the most ideal position to bring the continent together.50 
With Germany constructed as the hero of the new “European Community,” Signal also 
needed to present an enemy that threatened the community: the British Empire.  The English peo-
ple, according to the magazine, were a noble and superior people who, nonetheless, were controlled 
by greedy, aristocratic elites.  The magazine offers scathing critiques of the island’s stratified so-
ciety, which separated the “gloomy working class” from the “gay gentleman class”; historically, 
the gentleman class had reserved all political power for itself and exploited the English nation for 
profit.51  The start of the Second World War, however, threatened this elite.  As the German blitz-
krieg spread the National Socialist Revolution across Europe, the German blitz over England too 
had threatened to undo the British aristocracy through “bomb socialism”: cities were reduced to 
rubble, and English citizens were forced to work together in the streets and sleep together in shel-
ters, challenging traditional class structures with the promise of a truly national movement.  Un-
fortunately, Signal concluded, this revolution had been thwarted by English aristocrats like Win-
ston Churchill.  Rallying the masses to continue the war against Germany, the aristocrats had 
conned the young men and workers of England into fighting for the continuation of the “privileged 
society” rather than for the “nation.”52 
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As the magazine claimed throughout its five-year run, if England’s aristocrats did not care 
about the English nation, they certainly did not care about Europe. Their actions were driven purely 
by liberal economics and personal gain.  The goal of the English, therefore, was a “balance” on 
the continent of Europe; the peoples of Europe were to remain divided and rearrangeable – much 
like a jigsaw puzzle – in order to ensure that Europe could never form a unified front against 
England’s interests.53  Its Empire could, moreover, dominate the global economy and flood the 
continent with “cheap nigger and coolie labor.”54  The blind greed of English aristocrats, Signal 
argued, had weakened both the English nation and the nations of Europe, making them ever more 
vulnerable to the onslaught of the two great evils of the modern world: American capitalism and 
Soviet Bolshevism.  It was for this reason that the nations of Europe had to look to German lead-
ership.  Germany was fighting a revolutionary “war of unification,” in which elites would be de-
posed and nations reborn, building up a new European Community.  “That is our advantage over 
the people of the British Isles,” the magazine’s editorial proclaimed, “[the British] are remaining 
behind whilst we are striding forward.”55 
As Signal’s articles made clear, the creation of the European Community meant the resto-
ration of traditional nations within a larger empire.  A German hegemon – and only a German 
hegemon – could revive the nations of Europe.  Throughout the magazine, photo-essays portrayed 
Europe as a blossoming garden of diverse peoples: Russian peasants return to the soil after years 
of brutal Soviet collectivization,56 youth camps flourish in the rejuvenated France under Vichy,57 
and Hungarian peasants return to their national roots by wearing peasant dress and singing folk 
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songs.58  Not only had Germany revived the “nation,” but it had also united Europe’s nations be-
hind a common cause: European survival.  In a further attempt to foster collaboration between the 
occupied peoples and Germany, Signal commonly depicted the variety of volunteers fighting 
alongside the German Wehrmacht as “equals” on the Eastern Front: Frenchmen, Spaniards, Bel-
gians, Flemings, Dutch, Danes, Norwegians, Hungarians, Croats, Ukrainians, and Russians.  As 
these photos show, committed nationalists had a duty to protect the European Community and to 
fight alongside their German ally. 59 
Here, it is important to ask what the magazine meant by a European Community.  With a 
broad diversity of people and languages on the European continent, what was it that defined a true 
European as opposed to an American or a Soviet?  Signal’s answer was simple: Culture.  Culture 
was a European phenomenon, and fittingly enough, Signal placed Germany at the heart of a sup-
posed cultural renaissance now taking place in occupied Europe.  In this way, it could avoid the 
sticky question of national sovereignty. 
 
“The Great German Awakening,” Joseph Goebbels proclaimed in 1933, “[is] not purely 
political, but [is] a cultural one as well.”60  Kultur had always been a cornerstone of National 
Socialist ideology, emphasizing German brilliance in the areas of painting, sculpture, music, film, 
and literature.  The decades preceding Hitler’s ascension to power in 1933, according to the Nazis, 
had represented a dark age of cultural degeneracy and decline, when Germans had abandoned their 
cultural roots in Classicism and Romanticism for Modernism and Abstractionism.  By sloughing 
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off the years of degeneration, Hitler had created a new “Nazi Renaissance” in Germany, where the 
German “spirit” and “will” would break free of the chains of intellectualism, achieving new heights 
in the world of art.61  Signal magazine took many of its cues from propaganda within Germany.  
Focusing on its non-German audience, Signal carefully worked to construct an image of Germany 
as Europe’s natural leader.  The result was a delicate balancing act that strained credulity.  In 
theory, Kultur did not make Germany superior to other peoples, but nevertheless made it the stand-
ard-bearer of European Culture. 
From 1940 to 1945, Signal’s photos and articles portrayed a benevolent German hegemon, 
returning European culture to its ancient roots in Greece and Rome.  Neoclassicism permeated the 
pages of the magazine, especially in the aftermath of the conquest of Greece: German Luftwaffe 
bombers are pictured flying over the Acropolis, a swastika flag flutters between ancient columns, 
and the ruins of a temple loom in the background as German soldiers lounge on a beach.62  German 
soldiers themselves were romanticized as heroic figures, and Signal sought to mold them, quite 
literally, in the image of the ancient Greek warrior.  Images of nude German soldiers are littered 
throughout the magazine’s issues: men bathe nude together in a Greek hot springs, and, in a pho-
tograph titled “Soldiers of Tomorrow,” athletically-fit German men bare all for the camera as they 
undergo a medical examination.63  Signal wanted to present German soldiers as the spiritual and 
physical embodiment of the classical ideal, a theme found in many of the magazine’s articles.  
After the Soviet victory at Stalingrad, for example, the magazine artfully compared the defeat of 
the German Sixth Army to the Last Stand of the Spartans at Thermopylae, going as far as to refer 
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to General Paulus as the German “King Leonidas.” 64  Of course, this was a gross misrepresentation 
of the battle, where, in reality, the Germans had surrendered, not “fought to the last man.” 
Signal’s editors stressed the Classical and Hellenic roots of Western Culture, not only 
through the “virtues of war,” but through “classical beauty” as well.  The efforts of German ar-
chaeologists were documented by the magazine’s editors, and, on a number of occasions, the re-
naissance became quite literal.  In a 1940 photo-essay, the rediscovery of an ancient relief sculpture 
from the time of the Roman Emperor Domitian is detailed.  German ingenuity, the article states, 
had finally revealed the “classical beauty” of the sculpture to Europeans after being lost for nearly 
two-thousand years.65  According to National Socialist ideology, the beauty and power of classical 
art lay in its raw depiction of masculinity and femininity, unsullied by the distortions and abstrac-
tions of the interwar avant-garde.   
Seeking to depict Nazi Germany as the harbinger of a continent-wide cultural renaissance, 
Signal celebrated artistic collaboration between Germans and fellow Europeans.  During the sum-
mer of 1942, sculptures by the famed Nazi neo-realist sculptor Arno Breker were put on display 
in Paris at the Musée de l'Orangerie, and photographers for Signal were on-site to capture the 
cultural collaboration between Germans and French.  In one photograph, Jean Cocteau, the famed 
French artist and director, admires Breker’s classical nudes.  In an accompanying article, the 
overtly Fascist journalist and writer Robert Brasillach praises Breker’s sculptures as the embodi-
ment of the “new European esprit.”66  Because of the war, the article implied, Germany’s Kultur 
had been spread to the occupied peoples.  Many articles go further, complementing the realistic 
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human forms sculpted by non-Germans, such as the Croatian artist Ivan Meštrović.67  Because it 
was the antithesis of degenerate modernism, the revival of classical art would restore European 
culture in all its national variants, thereby reversing European decline in general. 
Kultur and neoclassicism were not the only tools, however, with which Germany combat-
ted “degenerate” modernism; a “return to the roots” also meant embracing Nazi traditionalism.  
Playing on fears of European decline and plummeting fertility rates, Signal promoted not only 
peasant lifeways, but also traditional family structures and gender roles.  Once again, Nazi Ger-
many was presented as the only culture Europeans could look to for guidance.  In Germany, the 
revolutionary spirit of National Socialism had restored the German family and rejuvenated German 
youth.68  Hitler had removed the crushing economic burden of the Versailles diktat, which had 
caused a decline in births and a “diminution of national strength.”  Because of National Socialism, 
the marriage rate was miraculously rising in Germany, and more German infants were being born 
than ever before.69  With the German conquest of Europe, National Socialism now offered to revive 
European families everywhere. 
Restoring European families ultimately meant returning European men and women to their 
traditional gender roles.  Before the war, modernism and liberal democracy had given rise to a 
“ridiculous spectacle”: the woman who “renounces domesticity, boasts of scientific knowledge, 
takes up politics, [and] dabbles with pen and ink.”  In abandoning her role as wife and mother, 
woman had taken on the role of man and defied the “natural” order, causing both the decline in 
fertility rates and the rise in sexual promiscuity.  In order to reverse its own decline and end modern 
degeneracy, Europe had to recognize the most fundamental law of nature: “Man makes history; 
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woman perpetuates the generations.”  According to Signal, traditionalism did not mean an imposed 
inequality, but instead a “natural equality.”  Society needed both man and woman, as each fulfilled 
a role only they were capable of fulfilling; man was the natural authority figure in society, while 
woman was the natural “helper.” Signal’s scientific editor elaborated: “typical vocations for 
women are those in which relations between people can be strengthened and cultivated …. Such 
professions include laboratory assistant, the secretary, and the nurse.”70 Signal’s emphasis on 
equality displayed the modern and revolutionary aspirations of Nazism, always in tension with its 
traditionalism. 
Ultimately, by presenting National Socialism as the purveyor of traditionalism and classi-
cism (and therefore, the crusader against modern degeneracy), Signal’s editors constructed Nazi 
Germany as the standard-bearer of Western culture and inheritor of the “European spirit.”  It was 
clear then that German hegemony was returning Europeans to their roots, and thus, ostensibly 
restoring Europe’s standing in the world.  For the Nazis, however, being the inheritor of the Greco-
Roman tradition was not enough.  Germany was Europe’s new hegemon, and therefore its new 
leader.  Naturally, the editors of Signal wanted to portray Germany as leading Europe into the 
future – primarily through technological advancement and an alternative modernity. 
One peculiar aspect of National Socialism (and fascist ideology more generally) was its 
scathing condemnation of the degenerative nature of modernity – including Enlightenment intel-
lectualism, liberalism, and democracy – and simultaneous celebration of many of the fruits that 
modernity bore – namely, technological advancement, consumerism, and mass politics.  Robert 
Paxton, a noted historian and expert on fascist ideology, attributes this seeming contradiction to 
two common sentiments of the time; many Europeans (including fascists) accepted the goals of 
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progress and individual freedom, but rejected the methods used to achieve those goals (liberalism 
and democracy), instead turning toward totalitarianism.71  This phenomenon, later termed “reac-
tionary modernism,” was prevalent not only in Germany, but in other countries in Europe as well, 
such as France and Italy.  
Signal appealed to this sentiment by embracing modern technology in particular, portray-
ing Nazi Germany as an enthusiastic pioneer in a number of fields.  The magazine is full of articles 
on Germany’s many technological achievements – in warfare, transportation, medicine, agricul-
ture, communication, fashion, and entertainment.72  Numerous articles praise Germany’s miracle 
drugs, miracle weapons, and development of railroads.73  These are accompanied by advertise-
ments for German-made radios, Mercedes cars, and sleek new designs for typewriters.74  The “Nazi 
Renaissance” itself had also allowed Germans to pioneer film, a new form of art.75  Occasionally, 
articles in the magazine focused on the various ways in which German ingenuity improved the 
lives of fellow Europeans.  In a 1941 photo-essay titled “Paris on Wheels,” the citizens of Paris 
enjoy leisure time and pleasure, all thanks to a “German invention,” the bicycle.  According to the 
essay, French, Dutch, and Danish peoples use the “German” bicycle widely, using it not only for 
pleasure, but for economic reasons as well – the bicycle saves fuel.  Once again, Signal employs 
pseudo-egalitarian rhetoric to explain the virtues of German hegemony: the German bicycle has 
given even the “poorest of the poor” access to transportation, and therefore, greater access to a 
society once dominated by the bourgeoisie and aristocracy.76   
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The culmination of German technology and German hegemony, a Signal editorial ex-
plained in 1943, would be the material unification of the European Community.  Technology had 
advanced faster than had the governing structures of European society.  Since the early nineteenth 
century, Europe had been governed by the old “Vienna System,” which left the continent divided 
into various quarreling, disparate nations.  This system made sense, according to the editors, when 
traveling across the continent took weeks or even months.  The twentieth century had come, how-
ever, and transportation technology – including trains, cars, and airplanes – was advancing much 
faster than Europe was advancing politically, threatening to make the once-powerful continent 
obsolete in the face of large, rising powers like the United States.  By erasing these “archaic” 
political boundaries and spreading technology, a hegemonic Germany was advancing the future of 
Europe and making Europeans competitive on the world stage once more.77  A map of the Euro-
pean continent in a 1941 issue of Signal displayed the continental rail-network being created by 
Germany, with the German capital as the hub.78  The allusion to the Roman Empire is striking – 
all roads lead to Berlin. 
Thus far, the message of Signal has been largely a message of hope.  The European Com-
munity was taking shape, and Germany was at the heart of the process.  There was, of course, a 
darker side to this message; Germany was not simply leading the Community, but protecting it 
from dangerous enemies.  While a roadblock to unity on the continent, English elites were por-
trayed by the magazine as more buffoonish than sinister – depicted merely as senile old men who, 
in their nearsighted quest for wealth and woeful disregard for others, had unwittingly sold Europe 
down the river to more insidious forces.  Those insidious forces were the ideologies of capitalism 
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and Bolshevism, which manifested physically in the United States and the Soviet Union. 
 
By 1945, American and Soviet forces had – quite literally – destroyed much of the cultural 
landscape of Europe.  In an article early that year, the editors of Signal observed dejectedly, “Ath-
ens is in ruins. Rome is threatened by civil war. The cathedrals of Europe have fallen to ashes.”79  
According to these writers, the Allies had waged a heartless war of “terror” in order to murder 
Europeans and annihilate their civilization.  This theme was not new in 1945, having appeared 
regularly throughout the pages of Signal during its run, especially after the launch of the Combined 
Bomber Offensive over Europe in 1943, which left countless cities in ruins and hundreds of thou-
sands dead.  The Allied targeting of civilian centers aided the Germans’ claim that “viciousness” 
and wanton “disregard for human life” were integral to the military traditions of the Allied nations.  
In one example, a 1944 historical article by military correspondent Walter Kiaulehn explained that, 
beginning with the American Civil War and General Sherman’s March to the Sea, American mil-
itary tactics had been targeted not at “enemy armies,” but at “enemy peoples.”  Implicit was the 
notion that an American invasion would mean a brutal campaign across Europe, where neither 
woman nor child would be spared.80  Ultimately, the destructiveness of the Allied campaign 
against Germany, both in material and human costs, was not the result of serious strategic consid-
erations, but of the underlying ideology of each nation.  The United States and the Soviet Union, 
the magazine argued, threatened to undermine national cultures and entire civilizations, and there-
fore threatened the very essence of what it meant to be European. 
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Time and time again, Signal held up the United States as a textbook example of what hap-
pened when modernity triumphed over tradition.  If modernity meant abandoning one’s roots, then 
the United States was a rootless society.  The American people had lost all sense of direction and 
succumbed to degeneration – unemployment robbed the common man of dignity and self-worth, 
racial groups mixed openly and clashed, American youth became truant and delinquent, and 
women abandoned all decency and sexual morality.81  Over the course of 1943, Signal published 
a series of articles titled “Americana” documenting the horrors of daily life in the United States.  
Reproducing material from the New York Times, Life magazine, Collier’s magazine, and Reader’s 
Digest, the editors sought to give the “Americana” series an air of authenticity, since it drew its 
conclusions from material produced by Americans.  Such topics included gang activity in Los 
Angeles, race riots in Detroit, a public museum in Chicago celebrating “degenerate art,” and the 
prevalent usage of marijuana, “a dangerous narcotic.”82 Particular revulsion was held for the phe-
nomenon of American “victory girls,” who greeted American servicemen freely with “hundreds 
of kisses” and other “unhygienic acts.”  The war had driven young American girls into prostitution, 
causing a rise in venereal disease among twelve to fifteen-year-olds.  “This [is] what we will have 
to expect,” the editors wrote, “if these Americans [are] to ‘civilize’ Europe.”83 
What exactly had Americans replaced their authentic culture with? According to Signal, 
the answer was capitalism.  Americans had grown materialistic and decadent, neglecting the na-
tional values that had once made them “a great nation.”84  With the spread of American economic 
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power came the spread of its societal decay.  Certainly, the editors argued, capitalism would cor-
rupt Europe if it ever gained a foothold on the continent: 
Technical progress, the work of the European, is a blessing as long as man-
kind does not make it one of its idols as in America, where people now live 
on tinned food, near standardized shirts, standardized hats and standardized 
suits.  Thinking has been standardized too and in American civilization 
there is no place for culture.  Today the standardized American is opposing 
Europe and her century-old cultural traditions.85 
 
With the United States now at war with Germany, and therefore with the European Community, 
the prospect of unbridled capitalism gaining a foothold on the continent suddenly became very 
real.  Signal depicted President Roosevelt as a dictator hungry for power and unwilling to step 
down, having broken the precedent for a two-term presidency in 1940.  The image of Roosevelt as 
dictator was combined with the image of Roosevelt as “dollar imperialist” – a man who sought to 
control other peoples through economic influence rather than direct political rule.  Roosevelt aimed 
to “colonize” Europe by destroying its culture, thus creating a new market for standardized Amer-
ican goods.86  Unlike Churchill and the English aristocrats, Roosevelt was no buffoon, but instead 
a cunning manipulator using Lend Lease to spread American military power all over the world 
while simultaneously placing an economic noose around the necks of his British “ally” and of the 
European continent.  For this reason, it was necessary that Germany create its own version of the 
Monroe Doctrine – the European Community – to defend Europe from foreign intervention.  The 
average American had no real interest in exploiting Europe, the magazine explained.  Because of 
capitalism, however, Americans had become a dumb mass captivated by “dollar values” and Hol-
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lywood films, now being led cluelessly into a war they did not understand.  By waging war, Roo-
sevelt was not only extending the interests of capitalism, but also distracting the American people 
from their own dire economic situation at home, effectively holding down the masses.87 
The United States, then, was a grave evil in the modern world, but, as Signal’s editors made 
clear, the ultimate threat to Europe lay not two thousand miles across the Atlantic, but directly 
across its eastern border. 
 From its very inception in 1920, National Socialism had identified Bolshevism as its ideo-
logical arch nemesis and the Soviet Union as the bastion of that ideology.  It was therefore only 
natural that anti-Soviet and anti-Bolshevist sentiment, both before and during Hitler’s rule in Ger-
many, became a staple of Nazi propaganda.  Time and again, frightening images of skulls, skele-
tons, grim reapers, rats, and spiders presented the Bolsheviks as the very incarnation of evil and 
death.88  Signal magazine embraced essentially the same message, except this time Europe, not 
Germany, was the object needing protection.89 
 The Second World War began, of course, with the awkward and uncomfortable alliance 
between the two ideological foes.  Signal’s editors did their best to explain the logic of the alliance 
in historical and strategic terms: Britain was the only country trying to break up the European 
Community, and the Soviet Union was giving Germany important foodstuffs, resources, and ma-
teriel that would make Europe impervious to the British blockade of the continent.90  The invasion 
of the Soviet Union in June 1941 ended this charade, allowing Signal’s editors to minimize their 
criticism of the English (a nation that many Nazis still admired) and to target the full force of their 
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propagandistic fury at the Soviet Union, the true enemy of Europe.  The summer of 1941 was a 
complete turnaround from Signal’s original messaging – the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was no 
longer depicted as a strategic effort on the part of Germany for resources, but instead as a Machi-
avellian act on the part of the Soviet Union to deceive Europe and secretly buildup its forces for 
war.  The German invasion was thus a preemptive act of self-defense rather than aggression.91 The 
goal of the invasion, according to Signal, was nothing less than the destruction of the Soviet Union 
and the Comintern, which had worked to undermine the sovereignty of Europe’s nations by sup-
porting puppet governments across the continent loyal to Stalin.92 
 Much like its treatment of the Allied bombings over Europe, Signal depicted Soviet forces 
as pitiless mass killers, treating the men, women, and children in its path – including Soviet civil-
ians – with unspeakable brutality.  What differs between coverage of the Allies on the Eastern and 
Western Fronts, however, is the graphic focus on atrocities on the Eastern Front.  Asiatic Bolshe-
vism was a truly savage ideology, devoid of all humanity.  Photo-essays depicted Soviet citizens 
– from the Baltic states in the north to Ukraine in the south – enthusiastically greeting the Nazi 
“liberators” freeing them from the shackles of Stalin’s dictatorship.93  Liberation was a strong 
theme here.  In some photos, political prisoners are freed from NKVD prisons, while others depict 
German soldiers kindly offering a hand to Soviet villagers as they rebuild their homes, destroyed 
by the heartless scorched earth policy of the retreating Red Army.94  In 1943, the magazine glee-
fully depicted the gruesome discovery at Katyn; dozens of graphic photographs show corpses rot-
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ting in the ground as investigators and Polish civilians look on in horror.  Again seeking to con-
struct the Soviet Union as the physical incarnation of evil and death, the magazine concluded that 
the massacre had been rooted in a “cruel philosophy” – Bolshevism – that posed a danger to “the 
whole of Western culture.”95 
 That cruel philosophy was analyzed in particular detail by Signal shortly after the 1941 
invasion, in an article ominously titled “The Soviets came,” implying that what had happened in 
Eastern Europe – in Poland, Belorussia, the Baltic States, and Ukraine – could happen in Central 
and Western Europe as well.  The Soviet Union, the editors warned, had no respect for national 
cultures.  In every country the Bolsheviks encountered, they overran the population living there 
and forcibly altered life, preparing the country for incorporation into the Soviet state.  Rather than 
the immediate imposition of a communist system, however, which would doubtless be met with 
strong resistance, the Bolsheviks pursued incremental change in five steps.  First, the Bolsheviks 
removed high officials through abduction, imprisonment, torture, and execution, to be replaced by 
fellow countrymen disloyal to their nation.  Then, the Bolsheviks seized the military and national-
ized private businesses while placing political commissars in universities to wipe away the national 
culture and indoctrinate young people with communist ideology.  In the final steps, independent 
citizens – farmers, workers, and skilled craftsmen – were forced off their land, robbed of their 
personal possessions, and pushed into collectives.  Photographs depicted this spread of Bolshevism 
into Eastern Europe.  Whereas in 1940, Latvians had “welcomed” annexation to the Soviet Union, 
by 1941, the entire population had been enslaved and reduced to fear, misery, and poverty.96  
 Interestingly, Signal identified an underlying evil that formed the foundation of both capi-
talism and communism: “rootless” cosmopolitanism, or the uniting of various peoples under a 
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single ideology.  Such unification sounds, in many ways, similar to the goal that Signal claimed 
Germany was working toward in its occupied territories: that of the creation of a single European 
Community.  However, the proposed community, the editors clarified, was a political space in 
which the German hegemon united Europe in order to protect national cultures, not repress them.  
The cosmopolitanism that manifested itself in capitalism and communism was clearly destructive 
of culture.  Multiculturalism meant, in truth, no culture at all.  In the Soviet Union, peoples of all 
kinds were removed from their roots in the soil and molded into a mindless, homogenous mass.  
In the United States, national and ethnic mixing was rampant because American capitalism wor-
shipped the almighty dollar at the expense of historic ethnic and racial segregation:  In Detroit, 
black workers mixed promiscuously with white ones in factories, inevitably leading to conflict,97 
and in California, Mexicans had settled in traditionally white areas, causing a spike in violence.  
Mexicans were “harmless, good-natured people,” the magazine assured, but once Mexican culture 
was allowed to mix with American white culture, degeneracy ensued, fueling the rise of horrors 
such as jazz music and youth gangs.98   
Some historians have interpreted this language as racist.  Such a label, however, hides more 
than it illuminates.  It would be more accurate to say that, taking its large, multi-ethnic audience 
into consideration, Signal avoided stating outright that particular groups and cultures were inferior.  
It made its argument in two subtle ways. First, it showed that mixing ethnic groups created cultural 
degeneration and inferiority; and second, it showed that, by allowing Europeans to follow their old 
traditions and resist the corrosive forces of modernity, Germany had reawakened a force that had 
lain dormant since the time of the ancients: the “European spirit.”  It is with a deeper analysis of 
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what Signal meant by the term “European spirit,” and whether “racist” is the best term to describe 
its content, that this chapter concludes. 
 
 According to National Socialist ideology, the fount of German Kultur was the German 
“spirit,” the sheer willpower to survive and thrive in a harsh, unsentimental world.  The German 
spirit, in the words of Joseph Goebbels, was a kind of “steel romanticism” which emphasized 
“intoxicating actions and restless deeds in service of a great national goal.”99  This emphasis on 
spirit and willpower was celebrated most famously in Leni Riefenstahl’s 1935 film Triumph of the 
Will.  Spirit was the source of all knowledge; the nation’s culture flowed from intuition and insight, 
not intellectual analysis.100  The revival of the spirit, therefore, was inherently opposed to intellec-
tual philosophies such as humanism, and yet, there was a contradiction here too.  The Ancient 
Greeks, that civilization so revered by the Nazis, were not only the foundation of Western art, but 
also of Western philosophy – rationalism and logic, those scourges of the modern world.  For those 
among Hitler’s followers who cared about consistency (and there were some among Signal’s col-
laborators), National Socialist ideology was confronted with an awkward dilemma: recognizing 
the value of Greek art while shunning Greek philosophy.  To reconcile this contradiction, the most 
intellectual among Nazi ideologues turned to the great nineteenth-century German philosopher 
Friedrich Nietzsche. 
 In 1872, Nietzsche published his book The Birth of Tragedy, a seminal work in the revival 
of Greek tragedy in German culture.101  Nietzsche’s works were well-known for invoking strong 
emotion with their somber, tragic tone.  Past German intellectual and cultural figures, such as 
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Goethe and Kant, had often invoked classical humanism in their works, but Nietzsche diverted 
from this tradition, instead romanticizing excess and chaos.  The Birth of Tragedy justified Nie-
tzsche’s diversion, explaining Greek culture and Greek tragedy as a dichotomy between Apollo-
nianism and Dionysianism.  Apollo was the god of “measure and perfect form,” while Dionysius 
was the god of “inspiration, intoxication, cruelty, glory, rapture, and life.”102  Tragedy could not 
exist solely in the world of the sunny and optimistic Apollo, but only between the clashing worlds 
of Apollo and Dionysius, the unending conflict between reason and instinct.  Nietzsche felt justi-
fied, therefore, in his celebration of Dionysius, who was a necessary and underappreciated element 
in Greek culture.  Most historians agree that Nietzsche would have abhorred National Socialism.  
Certain Nazi ideologues nevertheless saw great use in praising Nietzsche’s cultural legacy.  The 
Nazis celebrated Dionysian emotionalism over Apollonian reason, believing that, like Nietzsche, 
Dionysianism would usher in “the coming age of the übermensch.”103  The failure of Dionysian 
sentiment, on the other hand, would end only in renewed tragedy. 
 In 1943, as the German Wehrmacht began its long retreat from the Caucasus and the Rus-
sian steppes, Giselher Wirsing, the chief editor of Signal magazine, wrote an editorial explaining 
the purpose of the war, titled, “We, the Europeans.”  European history, like Ancient Greece, was 
depicted as a great tragedy.  Wirsing explained that Europe’s “civil wars,” the unending conflict 
amongst European nations over the centuries, had been the continent’s fatal error.  It was time for 
Europeans to reflect on the history of Ancient Greece and learn its lessons for Europe’s future 
survival.  Greece had venerated beauty and had established the Western cultural tradition, but its 
fabled history was still, ultimately, a tragedy.  Fellow Greeks could not find common ground with 
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one another, instead choosing to fight amongst themselves – Athenians, Spartans, Thebans, Mac-
edonians – and weakening Greek culture to the point of being overwhelmed by outside forces.  The 
lesson intended from this analogy was clear: Europeans, like their Greek predecessors, would 
slowly decline if they could not unite.  It was time for the European spirit to reawaken, ending 
Europeans’ petty disputes and allowing them to muster the willpower to fight together in defense 
of European culture. “Europe,” Wirsing argued, “is not a geographical but a spiritual concep-
tion.”104  What defined this European spirit?  In language indirectly borrowed from Nietzsche, 
Wirsing argued that this spirit was the will to struggle for the nation (and the rights of all European 
nations), resisting the ideologies of Bolshevism and capitalism. 
 Some scholars have identified Signal’s message as exclusively racist, highlighting as evi-
dence the magazine’s depiction of the Soviet Union – its peoples an animal-like mass and its ide-
ology Asiatic.  One French scholar has gone as far as to argue that this depiction casts Russians as 
subhuman, thereby transforming the war in the East into a racial struggle.105  Reviewing the mag-
azine’s discussion of the historical role of spirit, however, complicates this argument.  True, Signal 
does in fact divide people into distinct cultural groups (and physical differences appear); this said, 
it avoids identifying these groups by blood.  Multiple articles depict various ethnic groups from 
within the Soviet Union joining the European war against Bolshevism.106  Although “Asiatic” bol-
shevism made men culturally degenerate, it did not mean that these men could not adopt a Euro-
pean spirit and become “European” once the ideology of Bolshevism had been shaken off.107  For 
readers of Signal, cultural superiority seemed to arise from spirit alone; blood was not overtly 
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evoked in the magazine’s equation.108  Bolshevism’s source, ultimately, was Asiatic spirit rather 
than Asiatic blood.  Here, Signal strove to be inclusive; the emphasis on spirit was meant to define 
the war as a civilizational conflict rather than as a racial one.  Any European group outside of 
Germany could act as an “equal ally” within the larger European Community.  Blacks and Mexi-
cans in the United States were a different story, of course, and when it came to Europe’s millions 
of Jews, Signal simply fell silent. 
 Certainly, the emphasis on the revival of European spirit offered a hopeful message: If 
Europeans were willing to join their German “ally” in heroic struggle against the imperial inter-
lopers – the United States and the Soviet Union – then the European Community would become 
reality.  This hopeful message was, of course, accompanied by a darker message, reaching to the 
very depths of Europeans’ fears.  According to Signal, the failure of the European spirit would 
mean the failure of European culture, leading to the demise of not just Germany, but the entire 
European Community.  The scale of this “European tragedy” would be far greater than the tragedy 
that had befallen the Ancient Greeks:  the continent would lay prostrate as it became the battle-
ground in a climactic Third World War between the two rising powers, wiping away once and for 
all the nations of Europe.109  As the war came home to Germany in 1945, Signal’s predictions for 
the post-war order became evermore dire.  In one of the magazine’s final issues, it warned that the 
Soviet Union had successfully duped the Americans and the British into ceding it a “sphere of 
influence” in Eastern Europe.  This inherent weakness among the Western Allies would mean 
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ultimate Soviet victory in the event of a Third World War, and therefore, the spread of Asiatic 
Bolshevism across the entire continent.110 
 
Ultimately, Signal’s message was a message about two alternative worlds, two possibilities 
for the future that Europeans had to decide: one deceptively hopeful and one crudely fearful.  The 
fearful world was the world of a Europe in continuous decline, at the mercy of the United States 
and the Soviet Union.  The hopeful world, on the other hand, was a world in which Germany led 
a new and powerful European Community, a kind of Pax Germanica on the continent where “frat-
ricidal civil wars” were banished and the national cultures of Europe flourished.  By using the 
same language of “peace” as the fabled ancient empire it claimed to inherit, Nazi Germany justified 
its use of force in solidifying German hegemony.111 Signal showed that this Pax Germanica was 
already in full bloom in the early years of the war.  National cultures, from France and Holland to 
Croatia and Romania, were finally being restored after decades of degeneration, learning from the 
example of National Socialism in Germany.  Liberated Soviet citizens were being treated hu-
manely by German forces, and were rebuilding their cultures once crushed by Bolshevist ideology.  
All of this was occurring because the Germans had reawakened the European spirit.  If Europeans 
held on to this spirit, Signal assured, their nations and cultures would all have a place within the 
European Community as equal partners alongside the benevolent German hegemon.  Europe’s 
decline would be thwarted, its ancient harmony restored. 
Of course, this rosy picture of harmony, cooperation, and friendship was all a lie; just a 
cursory glance at domestic German propaganda reveals this fact.  As the Nazi newspaper Völk-
ischer Beobachter had explained to its German readers in 1930, “sprit alone does not ennoble: 
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much more is necessary for spirit to ennoble.  What is that? Blood.”112  For the National Socialist 
Party and the German Wehrmacht, the Second World War in Europe was not merely an ideological 
reckoning, but more importantly, a racial struggle for the very existence of the German people.  
Unlike the “civilizing mission” associated with Ancient Rome and the modern French and British 
Empires, Nazi ideology very narrowly defined what it meant to be German.  “Spirit” was some-
thing that was inherent in the blood; it could not be learned or instilled in others.113  Nazi Germany 
was building a Europe for the Germans, not for the Europeans.  In Hitler’s eyes, the nations of 
Europe were only useful as sources of food and raw materials; the fighting by thousands of Euro-
pean volunteers on the Eastern front was only incidental, and would have no effect on the postwar 
order.  “No illusions about allies!” Hitler had once shouted at his generals.114   
Most Europeans understood this fact; German repression was everywhere in Europe, alt-
hough heavier in some places than others.  In the east, mass killing actions had been initiated as 
early as 1939, and other examples of German propaganda in these countries openly portrayed the 
war as a racial struggle against Jewish Bolshevism.115  In 1942, West Europeans too began to feel 
the full force of German deportations, executions, and reprisals.116  By 1943 at the latest, the utter 
falsehood of Signal’s rosy picture was a foregone conclusion for most of the occupied peoples.  
Despite the reality of German rule and the inevitability of German defeat, however, many Euro-
peans continued their collaboration with Germany – especially committed anti-communists and 
fascists – in some form or another, whether through administrative assistance, military service in 
the East, or ideological support. 
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 In recognizing the existence of collaboration, one must turn one’s attention toward the al-
ternative vision of Europe presented by Signal, a fearful world in which the American capitalists 
and Soviet Bolsheviks defeated Germany.  Fear of the Soviet Union – and its communist ideology 
in particular – was already a palpable force in most European countries before the Second World 
War.  While many collaborators and fellow travelers with the Nazis understood the harsh “ex-
cesses” of German rule, they still supported the Nazi cause precisely because they felt it was pro-
tecting Europeans from dark forces, most importantly Bolshevism.117  It is likely, then, that Euro-
peans found the fearful message of Signal more persuasive than its pollyannaish counterpart.  The 
most illuminating evidence for this argument is a 1943 article from Signal written by Léon De-
grelle, head of the Fascist Rexist Party in Belgium.  Degrelle’s analysis of the war gives little 
impression that European volunteers on the Eastern Front were fighting out of hope for a European 
Community, but instead suggests that their motivation lay in a deeper fear of Bolshevism.118 By 
volunteering at the front, many European collaborators believed they were fighting for an equal 
seat at the table in a postwar order. 
Of course, the fear of Bolshevism was inextricably entwined with a delusional form of 
hope.  One must recall, for example, the movement for Franco-German rapprochement before the 
war.  In the years preceding 1939, many right-wing Frenchmen (and left-wing as well) nursed the 
illusion of a rapprochement with Germany.  Driven both by the fear of renewed war and the fear 
of communism (especially during the Popular Front government from 1936 to 1938), these French 
men and women were seduced by the aesthetic qualities of Nazi mass movement, which, if applied 
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to France, offered to shape the masses and to rejuvenate a French nation greatly weakened by war, 
communism, and the Popular Front.119  At the root of subsequent European collaborators’ embrace 
of National Socialism was thus a longstanding primal fear of national destruction.  As the German 
situation in the East grew evermore dire, high-ranking Nazi officials themselves continued to dis-
cuss the possibility of a new European confederation united against the Soviet Union and the 
United States, an idea strikingly similar to Signal’s proposal for a European Community.120 
 Examining Signal’s political message raises important questions:  was the magazine offer-
ing its readers mere propaganda fluff, or did its message, a nationalist strain of pan-Europeanism, 
have serious intellectual roots?  Could the message of European unity be separated from its mes-
senger, Nazi Germany?  The next chapter follows the careers of Max Clauss and Giselher Wirsing, 
two journalists who shaped Signal’s message and whose works for the Nazi regime shed light on 
the moral dilemmas – or lack thereof – faced by Germany’s conservatives under the Third Reich. 
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Chapter 3: “Intellectual War Criminals” 
 
“Through his writings, [Wirsing] persuaded the Conservative ele-
ment to underwrite Nazism, arguing that the more repugnant aspects 
were mere teething troubles of a young, revolutionary party. This 
was the first betrayal of the moral integrity on which he so loftily 
insists.”121 
 
        – U.S. Army Intelligence Report 
                                                           October 25, 1946 
 
 
 The years immediately following the end of the First World War and the revolutions of 
1918-1919 were traumatic for Europe, and nowhere more so than in Germany, which continued to 
reel from political upheaval, hyperinflation, and the perceived humiliation of the Versailles Treaty 
(or Diktat, as Germans preferred to call it).  In the eyes of many European statesmen, the cause of 
Europe’s sudden decline was the un-checked force of nationalism, which, they argued, drove Eu-
rope blindly into suicidal warfare with itself.  The solution, therefore, rested not with imperial 
nation-states, but instead with European integration.  Throughout the 1920s, groups such as the 
Pan-European Union and the European Customs Union came to the forefront of political debate 
on European integration, promoting economic cooperation and the dissolution of national barri-
ers.122 The nation-state, however, would remain the dominant unit in European affairs.  This de-
velopment did not trouble Europe’s conservatives and, in fact, was welcomed by most; as some of 
their intellectuals argued, European “unification” could and should take place alongside the nation-
state.  Although it seems peculiar to an onlooker today, this nationalistic strain of pan-Europeanism 
was taken up with passion by young German students, including future journalists and Signal ed-
itors Max Clauss and Giselher Wirsing. 
                                                          
121 Final Report on Giselher Wirsing (25 October 1946), WIRSING, GISELHER_0016.pdf, Nazi War Crimes Dis-
closure Act Special Collection. Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room, Central Intelligence Agency. 
www.cia.gov. 
122 Walter Lipgens, “Introduction,” Documents on the History of European Integration, p.5. 
46 
 
 There was, of course, a darker strain of nationalism that ultimately prevailed, one that pro-
moted not harmony but the philosophy that “might makes right.” Since the early 1920s, the leading 
theorist behind Nazi ideology, Alfred Rosenberg, had promoted the creation of “a European con-
tinent shaped along racist and Nordic criteria.”123 As Yale historian Timothy Snyder more aptly 
observed, “National Socialism was an apocalyptic vision of total transformation,” a vision where 
the Aryan masses would rise up and annihilate the Slavic peoples of the East, reclaiming for them-
selves their rightful place as the master race.124 Although they denounced Hitler’s rhetoric as crude, 
even obscene, Germany’s conservative elites brought him into power in 1933 and increasingly 
became fellow travelers of the Nazi regime over the next twelve years.  The young idealists Clauss 
and Wirsing were no exception, striving to reconcile their political views with Nazism, a reconcil-
iation that proved surprisingly easy for them even as they held on to the delusion of eventual Eu-
ropean unification.  Despite their serious misgivings about Nazism’s more violent impulses, both 
men legitimized Hitler’s regime through their work for Signal. 
 
 The careers of Max Clauss and Giselher Wirsing began at the University of Heidelberg, 
which both attended as students of sociologist Alfred Weber in the mid-1920s.  Alfred Weber, the 
younger brother of famed sociologist Max Weber, was an ardent supporter of Weimar.  In the early 
years of the Republic, Weber envisioned sociology as a pioneering field that would democratize 
the academic education of a new generation of German intellectuals.  The goal of democracy, he 
believed, should be to sew together “high” and “low” culture, to unite the bourgeoisie with the 
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working classes rather than dividing them.125  In 1924, Weber founded the Institute for Social and 
State Sciences (InSoSta) at Heidelberg, which, besides teaching sociology and political science, 
aimed to foster a democratic orientation among young German academics.  To this end, Weber 
constructed an atmosphere of “tolerant intellectual exchange” among the student body who ran the 
gamut of the political spectrum, from avowed communists to admirers of Italian fascism.  Culti-
vating and maintaining this atmosphere of toleration and dialogue, Weber believed, would give 
rise to a new generation who could successfully guide the German Republic into the future.  De-
mocracy was a necessary step in modernizing Germany, and it was the duty of academics, there-
fore, to depoliticize academia, to create a “discursive coalition” among academics that discouraged 
those who wanted to undermine Weimar.126 
 In 1925, Weber joined the European Cultural League and, the following year, founded the 
German-branch of the League at Heidelberg.  The group promoted cooperation and exchange be-
tween European intellectuals, and many of its members went further in supporting a federation of 
European states.  The goal of the league’s German-branch was more specific: to create some sem-
blance of a community in Europe “without sacrificing German national identity.”127 Indeed, Weber 
never believed in the creation of a pan-European state, promoting instead Mitteleuropa, a concept 
that took on various meanings but, in Weber’s mind, would mean a union of central European 
states (led, of course, by Germany) that put Germans on par with the powers of France and Britain.  
Despite Weber’s hopes for the group and his own democratic idealism, members of the European 
Cultural League trended anti-democratic and were, in any case, elitists.128 The League enjoyed 
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great success among the students and faculty at Heidelberg.  It is no surprise then that one of 
Weber’s students at InSoSta, Max Clauss, rose to become the head editor of the League’s official 
journal, the Europäische Revue. 
 Max Clauss was born in 1901 in the village of Offenberg, the son of a Bavarian textile shop 
owner and an Alsatian mother.129  He developed an affinity for French language and culture at an 
early age (one could speculate because of his mother), and would go on to study French literature 
in Paris in the early 1920s.  Later, Clauss moved his studies to the University of Heidelberg, where 
he earned a degree from InSoSta.  Influenced by his studies in Paris and Heidelberg, Clauss became 
a fervent supporter of Franco-German rapprochement in the 1920s, joining Weber’s German 
branch of the European Cultural League.130 Unlike the teacher Weber, the pupil Clauss embraced 
the idea of a “community” of nations in Europe, the leaders of which he argued should be France 
and Germany.  In general, members of the League distrusted liberal democracy and the rule of 
public opinion.  Mass politics developed in the nineteenth century, they believed, had led to the 
horrific outbreak of the First World War.  A peaceful community of Europe’s nations, therefore, 
had to be led by intellectual elites who knew better.131 
 As the editor for the Europäische Revue, the League’s official journal, Clauss worked to 
foster understanding between European academics.  Beginning in 1928, Clauss ran a short-story 
contest judged by a panel of literary critics, including authors like Thomas Mann, publishing 
within the journal’s pages the best stories written in German, English, French, Spanish, and Italian.  
Writing for The Criterion in 1930, the English poet T.S. Eliot praised Clauss’ contest, writing that 
it was “visible evidence of a community of interest, a desire of cooperation between…different 
                                                          
129 Willi Winkler, “Die Welt ohne uns.” Süddeutsche Zeitung, 19 October 2015. 
130 Guido Müller, “France and Germany after the Great War: Businessmen, Intellectuals and Artists in Nongovern-
mental European Networks,” Culture and International History, p.105-106. 
131 Ibid., p.100. 
49 
 
nations” that would “keep the intellectual blood of Europe circulating throughout the whole of 
Europe.”132 Clauss had befriended Eliot after a visit to London in 1926, and the two kept regular 
correspondence throughout the later 1920s.  Eliot, a follower of politics, expressed strong interest 
in Clauss’ proposal for a new “international philosophy of politics” based not in Marxism, but in 
“counter-revolutionary” nationalism. In the future, Clauss argued, Europe would be governed not 
by bureaucratic committees and leagues, but by a group of intellectual elites who, together, would 
guide the European community while preserving its distinct national identities.133 
 Building upon his interest in Franco-German rapprochement, Clauss also became a leading 
member of the Comité franco-allemand de Documentation et de l’Information, better known by 
its informal name, the Mayrisch Committee.  Founded in 1926 by a Luxembourgish steel magnate, 
Émile Mayrisch, the group consisted of eighty French and German representatives (the French in 
Berlin and the Germans in Paris) promoting the common national interests of each country.  Clauss 
was one of a few academics within the German delegation to Paris, which consisted primarily of 
businessmen and industrialists.134  Most members were veterans of the First World War.  While 
still conservative nationalists, the committee’s members understood the destructiveness of nation-
alism in its militaristic variant, and promoted the creation of a French-German common market as 
militarism’s peaceful solution.135 Despite its lofty goals, the Mayrisch Committee accomplished 
little and was seen by most onlookers as merely a symbolic gesture, a failure.  After only seven 
years in existence, the group quietly dissolved in 1933, with one German member bitterly detesting 
his French colleagues: “The Frenchman does not think about Europe, but only about France.”136 
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 While Clauss was busy editing the Europäische Revue and conducting diplomacy for the 
Mayrisch Committee in Paris, his friend and fellow Heidelberg alumnus Giselher Wirsing was 
pursuing his own career in politics and writing.  Born in 1907 in the Franconian city of Schwein-
furt, Wirsing grew up the son of a wealthy conservative businessman.  His father imbued him with 
an intense sense of nationalism and, by Wirsing’s own account, anti-Semitism.  Enraged by the 
Versailles diktat, the father once encouraged a teenaged Wirsing to join the Freikorps Oberland.137  
Such experiences had a significant impact on Wirsing’s later beliefs, but he would not join the 
Nazi party until several years after Hitler’s ascent to power in 1933.  Upon his graduation from the 
local gymnasium at Schweinfurt in 1926, the nineteen-year-old Wirsing began his studies at In-
SoSta at Heidelberg, where he eventually earned a PhD in economics and political science in 1931.  
A bright student, Wirsing became fluent in English, French, and Spanish during his studies, and, 
from 1930 to 1932, worked part time as a dozent (lecturer) for the university.138 Wirsing would 
rise to prominence in the last years of Weimar, however, as an editor for the influential conserva-
tive-nationalist magazine Die Tat, which he joined in 1930. 
Although anti-democratic in his beliefs, Wirsing embraced Weber’s idea of Mitteleuropa, 
a federal order in Central Europe led by Germany.  In his work for Die Tat, Wirsing espoused his 
hopes for Mitteleuropa, one that was both anti-capitalist and nationalist.  Intriguingly, much of 
Wirsing’s political invective, during both the Weimar and Nazi eras, was focused on capitalism 
rather than Bolshevism.  Mitteleuropa, along with the rest of Europe, had to unite against the de-
structive force of Amerikanismus and its hyper-capitalism.  Many of Wirsing’s editorials for Die 
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Tat railed against “corrupt” industrialists and big business, often targeting firms such as Krupp and 
IG Farben for degrading the German middle classes in pursuit of profit.  The editorial staff of Die 
Tat in the early 1930s was young, radical, and appealed to a similar set of beliefs held by National 
Socialists while rejecting the ideology’s more racist elements.139 Wirsing was not a believer in the 
“Nordic blood” myth, but held on to a more traditional form of anti-Semitism instead, one that 
portrayed Jews as acquisitive swindlers who tricked decent, Christian people into parting with their 
money.140 Wirsing did agree with the Nazis, however, that Jews were largely behind the capitalist 
conspiracy against Germany. 
To Wirsing and most of the editorial staff at Die Tat, writing at the onset of the Great 
Depression, the central question facing Germans was the crisis of capitalism and the middle class.  
Promoting nationalism, anti-capitalism, and pseudo-socialism, Wirsing’s writings aligned closely 
with National Socialism – and, more precisely, with the party line towed by Gregor Strasser, not 
the racialist Alfred Rosenberg.  Despite this alignment, Wirsing remained an elitist; it would ulti-
mately be the intellectual elites, he argued, and not a mass movement of the people, that would 
guide Germany into the future.  During the last years of Weimar, Wirsing officially opposed Hitler 
and the Nazis, whom he regarded as vulgar and uncouth.  During the 1932 presidential election, 
Wirsing, by this time a prominent voice in German politics, encouraged his readers to vote for 
Hindenburg.  In early January 1933, Wirsing and a group of fellow writers sat down with General 
Kurt von Schleicher, urging him to replace the weaker Hindenburg as president and to act as a 
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check in power over the Nazis.  Shocked by such a proposal, Schleicher “booted the young upstarts 
out of his office.”141 
 On January 30, 1933, President Paul von Hindenburg appointed Adolf Hitler as Germany’s 
new Chancellor in a conservative coalition government.  Most believed that the conservatives 
would keep Hitler in check, but, as the world soon learned, such hope was a delusion.  In the spring 
of 1933, most of the University of Heidelberg’s Jewish faculty were dismissed, including a sizea-
ble portion from Alfred Weber’s Institute for Social and State Sciences.  In April, Weber himself 
stepped down from the faculty, and InSoSta quietly closed its doors.142 
 
 The years from 1933 to 1938 were pivotal both for Max Clauss and Giselher Wirsing.  
Despite their previous reservations about National Socialism – its vulgarity, its anti-elitism, its 
populism, its racism – both men accepted the demise of the hated Weimar Republic and recognized 
Hitler as Germany’s future.  Enjoying greater success as journalists than ever before, they increas-
ingly acted as apologists for the Nazi regime – not just to conservatives within Germany, but to a 
nervous international community.  Hitler promised to reverse Germany’s acceptance of the Ver-
sailles diktat, rebuild a depressed economy and middle class, and restore Germany to its rightful 
status as a great power – all steps in the right direction.  The regime’s negative aspects were mere 
“teething troubles,” they believed, which would be corrected in due time.143 
 Clauss, ever the Francophile, spent most of the 1930s living in Paris and working as a 
foreign news correspondent for a number of papers, including Dienst aus Deutschland and the 
                                                          
141 Department of State Airgram (23 November 1965), WIRSING, GISELHER_0027.pdf, Nazi War Crimes Disclo-
sure Act Special Collection. Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room, Central Intelligence Agency. 
www.cia.gov. 
142 Colin Loader, Alfred Weber and the Crisis of Culture, 1890-1933, p.113. 
143 Final Report on Giselher Wirsing (25 October 1946), WIRSING, GISELHER_0016.pdf, Nazi War Crimes Dis-
closure Act Special Collection. Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room, Central Intelligence Agency. 
www.cia.gov. 
53 
 
Berliner Tageblatt, a paper that remained independent of the Nazi Party until its closure in 1939.144  
In 1934, the German Foreign Office placed Clauss on its payroll in return for Clauss' regular in-
ternational reports for the syndicated press in Germany.145  While there was propaganda value in 
most of his work, Clauss continued to write on Franco-German rapprochement, his favored topic, 
throughout the 1930s. 
 Wirsing, like Clauss, enjoyed success under the Nazis.  In 1933, Wirsing left Heidelberg, 
returned to school in Berlin, and by October that year had settled in Munich where he accepted a 
position as a journalist for the largest newspaper in southern Germany, the Münchner Neueste 
Nachrichten.146 Concluding that its owners were “politically unreliable,” the SS had purged most 
of the paper’s management in 1933, clearing the way for Wirsing to rise quickly through its ranks 
– from journalist, to assistant editor, to foreign editor, to chief editor of the paper in 1938.  Despite 
his open affinities for Gregor Strasser – a rival of Hitler’s purged during the Night of the Long 
Knives in 1934 – Wirsing enjoyed the support of the paper’s publisher, Eher-Verlag, who also 
published the Nazi Party’s official paper, the Völkischer Beobachter.  Conversant in four lan-
guages, Wirsing travelled frequently as a journalist for the Munich paper, visiting countries in 
Central and Western Europe as well as the Middle East and the United States.  Based on these 
travels, he wrote books in 1933, 1934, and 1935 on international politics and on Germany’s role 
in Europe.  Wirsing quickly became something of a foreign affairs expert in Nazi Germany, and 
formed close friendships with members of the German Foreign Office.147 
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 By 1938, Wirsing was one of the most highly-regarded journalists in Germany.  As he had 
during Weimar, Wirsing continued to write invective against the United States and Great Britain, 
the two powers he saw as most responsible for Germany’s suffering after the First World War and 
for the spread of corrosive capitalism.  By this time, he had also become a fervent supporter of 
National Socialism, both publicly and privately.  Wirsing endorsed Nazi expansionist policy in his 
editorials, claiming its ultimate goal to be the creation of a “Federal Europe” that embraced Kultur 
over capitalism and communism.  In his private conversations, Wirsing claimed to have no illu-
sions about National Socialism; the Nazis were, he recognized, a violent group whose political 
rule, nevertheless, constituted a necessary and inevitable stage in Germany’s rise to national great-
ness and in Europe’s confrontation with capitalism and Bolshevism.  A 1946 U.S. intelligence 
report summarized his early justifications for Nazism: 
To [Wirsing], Fascism, democracy, and communism were but 
symptoms of the age-old clash of cultures, part of the dynamic strug-
gle between decay and growth, the pattern of history blindly and 
often brutally groping for fulfillment. Nazism was injecting new 
vigor into a people forgetful of its destiny.148 
 
In dismissing National Socialism as transient, a mere stage in some greater process, conservative 
writers like Giselher Wirsing and Max Clauss worked to make National Socialism more palatable 
to skeptical Germans.  Both argued there was no need for opposition toward the Nazis, and, in fact, 
that they should be embraced.  In building up the German nation, Hitler was also building up 
Germany to be the leader of a future Europe that was united against capitalism and Bolshevism.  
For this reason, the two writers took part in the Comité France-Allemagne, a French group founded 
in 1935 that promoted the greatness of Hitler’s Germany alongside that of France and argued for 
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stronger economic and cultural relations between the two. Elated by the Anschluss with Austria in 
March 1938, Wirsing officiated his support for the Nazi regime by joining the Allgemeine-SS.149 
 More troubling than their support for Nazism, however, was the silence on, and implicit 
approval of, violence against Jews and political minorities.  For all his post-war claims about being 
a non-racist, a decent German who saw the moral faults within National Socialism, Wirsing not 
only stayed silent on Nazi violence in the 1930s but contributed to it.  In late 1937, Wirsing traveled 
to the British Mandate of Palestine in his official capacity as foreign editor for the Münchner Neu-
este Nachrichten.  Covering the Arab revolt against the British authorities, he conducted extensive 
interviews with Arab leaders, British authorities, and the Jewish settlers whose presence had 
sparked the revolt.  In early 1938, these interviews became the foundation for Wirsing’s newest 
book Engländer, Juden, Araber in Palastine.150  In the book, he postulated that a future Jewish 
state in Palestine would act not merely as a national home for the Jews, but as the “Vatican” of 
international Jewry, an expansionist state that sought to extend its regional and later global hegem-
ony.  Denouncing the British government as the “throne of David,” Wirsing argued that Britain 
and its capitalist financiers were central to the larger international Jewish conspiracy against Eu-
rope.151  The British had encouraged the Zionist project, he wrote, and were therefore solely re-
sponsible for the chaos unfolding in the Middle East – never mind the fact that Nazi violence was 
driving tens of thousands of German Jews to settle in Palestine.  Wirsing, repeating much of the 
same anti-capitalist rhetoric against the British as he had in Die Tat, now injected his writing with 
a strong dose of anti-Semitism.  This same anti-Semitic theme would appear in Wirsing’s later 
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works on Britain and the United States.152  In March 1941, Wirsing spoke as an expert on Judeo-
capitalism at the opening of the “Institute for Research of the Jewish Question” in Frankfurt.153  
Later, in November 1943, a declaration signed by Hitler himself was presented to Wirsing, recog-
nizing him for his propaganda efforts against the enemies of the Reich.154 
 Their writings in defense of Nazi foreign policy not only earned Giselher Wirsing and Max 
Clauss renown in Germany, but attention abroad as well.  In 1938, both visited the United States 
at the behest of the German Foreign Office.  Clauss, arriving in January 1938, began a lecture 
circuit across the country, speaking to universities and foreign policy circles about Germany’s 
future role in Europe and the world.  Hosted by the Foreign Policy Association in New York, his 
first event on January 22, titled “The Church and the State in Germany,” took the form of a debate 
between Clauss and Dr. Henry Smith Lieper, the head of the Universal Christian Council.  Dr. 
Leiper denounced the Nazi regime as “pagan,” criticizing its emphasis of race over brotherhood, 
the undermining of Christian faith, the arrests of Christian pastors, and its brutal treatment of the 
Jews.  Clauss reacted forcefully, arguing that “National Socialism strongly rejects a godless society 
which, as is well known, is one of the principal aims of Bolshevism.” No pastor, Clauss insisted, 
had ever been arrested for his religious beliefs; all Germans were free to believe in a “brotherhood” 
between Germans and Jews.  Clauss’ speech, a New York Times reporter observed, had not been 
well received by the audience.155  Hostile reactions would define the rest of Clauss’ visit to the 
United States, as he travelled from New York to Washington, Los Angeles and Chicago.156 
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 Still enjoying the success of his recent book on British Palestine, Wirsing received an in-
vitation from Hans-Heinrich Dieckhoff, Germany’s ambassador to the United States, in March 
1938 to visit New York and Washington, D.C.  Arriving in New York with his wife on April 23, 
Wirsing met with Henry Luce, the owner of Time, Life, and Fortune magazines, as well as with 
Anne O'Hare McCormick, a correspondent for the European bureau of The New York Times.  In 
Washington, Wirsing secured a number of interviews with the help of the German Embassy, in-
terviews that included various State Department officials as well as U.S. Senators Burton Wheeler, 
Robert Taft, and Arthur Vandenberg.157 With the help of Ambassador Dieckhoff, Wirsing secured 
an interview with President Roosevelt himself. Roosevelt was upset over the recent Anschluss, 
Wirsing wrote in his paper, and dismissed claims that it was the will of the entire Austrian people. 
Foreshadowing much of his invective against the United States in Signal magazine, Wirsing wrote 
that Roosevelt was “filled with hatred for all things German” and that it was his intent to redirect 
domestic dissent against the New Deal toward a foreign enemy, Germany.158 
 In interviews conducted by U.S. interrogators after the war, Wirsing recalled conversations 
he had had with Ambassador Dieckhoff over German foreign policy toward the United States and 
Great Britain.  While supportive of the Nazi regime, Dieckhoff loathed Hitler’s Foreign Minister, 
Joachim von Ribbentrop.  He complained to Wirsing that Ribbentrop’s policies toward the United 
States were “shortsighted,” especially his encouragement of the German American Bund, which 
many politically-aware Americans regarded as a Nazi fifth-columnist group.  Furthermore, 
Dieckhoff sensed a warming relationship between the United States and Great Britain.  Wirsing 
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and Dieckhoff continued their correspondence after Wirsing’s departure from the U.S., writing 
each other over the course of 1938 and 1939 concerning their opinions on the Munich agreement 
and Hitler’s designs on Poland.  Dieckhoff continually warned the Foreign Office that in the event 
of a war between Germany and Great Britain, the United States would be much more inclined to 
enter a war in Europe on the side of Britain.  Throughout the spring and summer of 1939, Dieckhoff 
voiced his own concerns to Wirsing, warning that involving only Stalin and not Britain in negoti-
ations over the “Polish Question” could prove disastrous, drawing Germany into war with Britain 
and, eventually, the United States.159 Over the course of the Second World War, which erupted 
later that year, Wirsing maintained his support for the Nazi regime, continuing his work both as 
journalist and propagandist.  His doubts about Hitler would persist, but he would only intervene at 
the eleventh hour, when Germany was already doomed to certain defeat. 
 
 In August 1939, just before the outbreak of war, Wirsing and Clauss accepted invitations 
from Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop to join the Propaganda Section of the Foreign 
Office.  Here, in the autumn of 1939, both were recruited by the Wehrmacht to work on a new 
propaganda magazine, Signal, being developed for Europeans now being brought under the Ger-
man heel.160  At Wirsing’s recommendation, Signal’s creators centralized the magazine’s message 
around the New Order being constructed in Europe – a message that both Wirsing and Clauss 
seemed to believe in on some level.  Despite his role in forming the magazine, Wirsing stayed with 
the Foreign Office for only a short time, departing sometime in early 1940 before the first issue of 
Signal ever went to the press.  Goebbels’ frequent meddling and squabbles with the Foreign Office 
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over its Propaganda Section had convinced Wirsing that his work there was largely useless.  Signal, 
as all things in Nazi Germany, was governed by institutional chaos and competition; created and 
distributed by the Wehrmacht, overseen by the Foreign Office, and laid claim to by Goebbels’ 
Propaganda Ministry, it was never clear exactly who had control over the magazine.  Wirsing 
returned to Munich to resume his role as editor for the Münchner Neueste Nachrichten, but kept 
in frequent contact with the Foreign Office.161 
 Clauss stayed on the project as an editor for Signal, becoming one of its leading personal-
ities in the early years from 1940 to 1942 thanks to his political articles.  Little of the magazine’s 
content during this time was political, focusing rather on entertainment.  Nevertheless, the hopeful 
tone set by Signal, especially on the new European Community being constructed by Germany, 
was largely determined by Clauss.  Reflecting much of his work during Weimar encouraging Eu-
ropean unity, Clauss praised Hitler as the German Napoleon bringing peace to the Continent, em-
phasizing “the urge for unity no European nation could now escape.”162 Efforts to unite Europe 
after the First World War, Clauss argued, had all failed because they sought to keep the German 
people weak and divided.  Now, with the help of a newly reinvigorated Germany under Hitler, 
Europe’s nations were uniting of their own accord.163 Of course, Europe’s nations were not being 
united but dominated through German aggression and violence.  Clauss could use the existence of 
governments such as Vichy, however, to argue otherwise.  In spring 1943, Clauss published his 
book Tatsache Europa (The Fact of Europe) where, expanding upon his writings for Signal, he 
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again spoke of the “beleaguered European space” – a space that was not “geographic,” but “spir-
itual.”164  Amazingly, Clauss’ rhetoric on European unity changed very little from his time as an 
editor for Europäische Revue in 1926 to his time as a Nazi propagandist in 1943 – except now, the 
role of Europe’s savior was filled not by an elite group of intellectuals but by Germany’s Führer, 
Hitler.  The Second World War, he insisted, would be the last “intra-European war” – all conflict 
afterward would be directed only at the non-European powers of Great Britain, the United States, 
and the Soviet Union, after which Europe would arise “new and complete for the first time.”165 
Clauss argued, furthermore, that Germany’s central role in this new Europe was imperative to 
“impose order” on the new community.  “Order,” the philologist Victor Klemperer wrote shortly 
after the war, was a convenient, “euphemistic pretext for the use and abuse of power” by the Nazis, 
justifying acts of violence and mass murder against other Europeans.166  Certainly Clauss was 
aware, as were most Germans, of the atrocities being committed in the East and the purge of Jews 
in the West.  It is difficult to say, however, whether Clauss truly believed in what he was writing 
for Signal; indeed, one must ask whether his argument for European unity and German hegemony 
during the Nazi period – reflective of his youthful idealism during Weimar – was, by 1943, merely 
an insincere, propagandistic contrivance.  Clauss’ influence over Signal decreased significantly 
during its final years from 1943 to 1945.  After the war, Clauss fled Germany for fascist Portugal, 
where he left behind politics and took up work as a shipping merchant in Lisbon.167 
 Wirsing, back as chief editor of his Munich paper in 1940, resumed his writings on inter-
national affairs and on the progress of the war.  During the period from 1940 to 1942, Wirsing 
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often argued for more lenient policies toward the occupied nations, especially France, which could 
serve as useful sources of volunteers in the fight against the British.  During his postwar interro-
gations with the U.S. authorities, Wirsing recalled a meeting he had had with Rudolf Hess in March 
or April 1941, just weeks before Hess’ botched flight to Scotland seeking peace with the British.  
Hess knew Wirsing to be an “expert” on British politics, having read his articles and recent book 
on the British Empire, and discussed with Wirsing the prospects of an alliance between Britain 
and Germany.  Wirsing found the conversation quite odd and only realized its significance after 
the invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, knowing Hess had been afraid of a two-front war.168 
Wirsing’s prominence attracted the attention of high officials in the government, although not al-
ways in a positive light.  Throughout late 1941, he received criticism from some officials for call-
ing for a formal “alliance” with Vichy France in the fight against the Soviet Union.  Feeling the 
pressure of increased censorship, Wirsing decided to leave his position at Münchner Neueste Na-
chrichten.169 
In April 1942, Wirsing was attached to the 56th Panzer Corps as a Kriegsberichter (war 
reporter) on the Eastern Front.  His time there was brief; while never publicly critical of Germany’s 
war efforts, Wirsing grew increasingly distressed over German “treatment” of Soviet civilians.  
Although never mentioned in his postwar interrogations, he likely witnessed German atrocities 
firsthand and, moreover, was painfully aware of the growing partisan movement against the Wehr-
macht.  Of course, Wirsing had never taken issue with Nazi brutality against racial minorities, so 
one must speculate here that Wirsing’s protests over German policies were born not from any 
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underlying humanitarian sentiment, but from the cold realization that Germany needed allies in its 
fight against the Soviets. Wirsing claimed to have written several memoranda to officials in Berlin 
concerning the matter and to have received a curt reply from Martin Bormann asking that he cease 
all reporting on the Eastern Front.  In December 1942, Wirsing contracted jaundice and returned 
to Germany for treatment.170 
Having maintained his connections with the Foreign Office, Wirsing decided to remain in 
Germany and resume his work with the Foreign Office’s propaganda section.  In January 1943, 
Wirsing joined the production team for Signal magazine once more as a writer and editor, and 
from then until 1945, largely determined the direction of the magazine.171  No issue of the maga-
zine appeared in 1943 without an editorial written by him.  Wirsing’s employment with Signal 
coincided with the German defeat at Stalingrad and the shift in the magazine’s message from Ger-
many’s good works to the triple-threat now facing Europe – the United States, Great Britain, and 
the Soviet Union.  His experiences on the Eastern Front especially had a profound impact on him; 
while continuing to denounce the decadent capitalist societies of the United States and Great Brit-
ain, Wirsing devoted evermore space in Signal to the threat posed by the Soviet Union.  Wirsing 
used his editorials for Signal to point out the inherent weaknesses in the alliance between the 
Western Allies and the Soviets, noting that any future Soviet “sphere of influence” in Europe 
would be used later as a base to launch a Third World War against the West.172 The Red Army, 
Wirsing wrote, was “employing a battering ram in order to smash down the solid gate to our con-
tinent.”  That gate, of course, was being guarded by Germany.173 And by late 1943, it was clear 
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that Germany had done a poor job as Europe’s “guard”: the Red Army had retaken the Caucasus, 
defeated the Wehrmacht at Kursk, and were advancing deep into Ukraine. 
Accompanying Wirsing’s increasing influence over Signal was his creeping fear that Ger-
many would lose the war.  Much of 1943 was spent outside of Germany, travelling through Den-
mark, France, Spain and Italy on assignment for Signal or meeting with officials from the Foreign 
Office, such as Dieckhoff (now ambassador to Spain) or Adam von Trott zu Solz.  In March, 
Wirsing visited Rome to discuss technical and distribution problems with the Italian edition of 
Signal.  Most of the following year, from summer 1943 to summer 1944, was spent in Paris and 
Madrid.174 Wirsing was meeting with Ambassador Dieckhoff in Madrid on July 20th, 1944 when 
the attempted assassination and coup against Hitler unfolded.  Dieckhoff was recalled to Berlin 
immediately following the attempt, as it was suspected he may have been involved in the plot.175  
Wirsing left Spain shortly after Dieckhoff, travelling first to Milan and then to Paris, where the 
city was awaiting the arrival of the Allies.  Many of Wirsing’s acquaintances in the Foreign Office 
were arrested and executed for their connections with the July 20th Plot, including Adam von Trott, 
who was supposed to have led negotiations with the Western Allies in the event of Hitler’s death.176  
As it turned out, Wirsing was never questioned or recalled to Berlin. 
Wirsing stayed on assignment for Signal in Paris until August 19th, when the liberation of 
the city had begun. In an article for Signal titled “The Last Days of Paris,” Wirsing recalled the 
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mood of the city, stating that he was impressed with the “sympathetic” attitude that most Parisians 
expressed toward the remaining Germans.  What truly affected Wirsing in private, however, was 
bearing witness to the utter collapse of Germany’s western armies in the face of the Allied on-
slaught.  Continuing the war and the suffering of the German people, he now believed, would be 
senseless.  The war could only end with the complete destruction of Germany, unless Hitler was 
willing to negotiate a separate peace with the Western Allies, whom Wirsing regarded as “so woe-
fully unaware of the Bolshevist danger.”177  At Germany’s eleventh hour, Wirsing now set out to 
oppose Hitler’s policies. 
 
 Sometime in mid-September 1944, Wirsing met with SS-Brigadeführer Walter Schellen-
berg, Germany’s Head of Foreign Intelligence.  The two men had spoken earlier in 1944, in a 
meeting arranged by Adam von Trott before the July 20th Plot.178  For years, Schellenberg had 
followed Wirsing’s writings in Die Tat and Münchner Neueste Nachrichten, impressed by his in-
tellect and largely in agreement with Wirsing’s analysis of the military and political situation fac-
ing Germany.  Both men agreed that Germany’s military situation was hopeless and that a peace 
agreement had to be reached with the Western Allies as soon as possible, before Germany no 
longer held a position of strength.  Both concluded at the end of the meeting that there could be no 
peace so long as Hitler remained head of government; a negotiated peace with the Allies would 
require regime change.  Schellenberg asked Wirsing to prepare a series of “moderate, unbiased 
reports” presenting the full gravity of the military and political situation and proposing specific 
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policies to be implemented in order to prevent the collapse of Germany.  These reports, Schellen-
berg told Wirsing, would be distributed to high ranking officials in Hitler’s inner circle, including 
Himmler, Fegelein, and Walther Hewel, a personal friend of Hitler’s.  Schellenberg offered to 
provide Wirsing with all intelligence, bar none, reaching Ausland-SD, the Reich Foreign Intelli-
gence Service.  Wirsing agreed to write the reports.179 
 The first report was released in October 1944, written anonymously because of Wirsing’s 
previous conflicts with members of Hitler’s inner circle, including Martin Bormann.  The gist of 
the reports, written until March 1945, was the necessity for negotiations with the Western Allies.  
In some of his more remarkable reports, Wirsing called on Himmler to settle the “Jewish Question” 
in a more peaceable manner to ensure smooth negotiations, fearing that a complete “liquidation” 
of surviving Jews would hurt any remaining chance at peace.  One report called for the release of 
60,000 Jews to neutral Switzerland, a proposal Hitler immediately dismissed.180 Wirsing did not 
address the Holocaust in emotional terms, but rather in strategic ones.  The Western Allies had 
begun receiving intelligence on Nazi extermination camps from the Soviets as early as July 1944, 
and by the winter of 1944-1945, they were realizing that the atrocity stories were more than mere 
Soviet propaganda.  The release of surviving Jews, Wirsing believed, could be a basis for negoti-
ations.  
 Wirsing and Schellenberg agreed to name the reports the “Egmont Reports,” in reference 
to a quotation from Goethe’s 1788 play Egmont: “It is not right to oppose the king, yet one must 
stand in the way of the king who takes the first unfortunate steps along the wrong path.”  Of course, 
the “king” in this quote was a not-so-subtle reference to the Führer.  Both men hoped that the war 
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could be concluded as the First World War had been concluded in 1918, without an Allied-occu-
pation of Germany and with a new government taking the place of Hitler.181  When presented with 
the “unvarnished” truth in the reports, they reasoned, Hitler might step down and allow Himmler 
to take his place.  By November, however, it was already apparent that Hitler was “displeased” 
with the reports and rejected their conclusions.  In correspondence captured by U.S. forces at the 
end of the war, Schellenberg had written to Wirsing: 
It is thus an established fact that Hitler is incapable of accepting any 
view of the international situation that does not jibe with his precon-
ceived ideas. We have therefore got to reconcile ourselves to the fact 
that we are dealing with a pathological case.182 
 
In all, Schellenberg and Wirsing released thirteen reports.  That these men had believed the reports 
could change Hitler’s mind was a testament to how deluded they were and how caught up they 
were in Hitler’s alternative world.  Knowing that the reports had failed their goal, Schellenberg 
discontinued them in March 1945. 
 
Through the entire period from October 1944 to March 1945, Wirsing remained in Berlin 
as editor-in-chief of Signal magazine.  Bombing raids over Berlin in late 1944 struck the main 
building of Deutscher Verlag, damaging a number of machines and forcing Signal’s staff to relo-
cate their operations to a makeshift site on the outskirts of Berlin near Potsdam.183 Amazingly, the 
magazine continued to be published as late as March 1945 (possibly into April) in as many as 
fourteen languages, despite the fact that Germany no longer controlled the territories where most 
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of the magazines were destined for.184  By this time of course, even the editorial staff at Signal had 
accepted that the war was lost; there was no talk in Signal of Hitler’s “miracle weapons.”  In one 
of the magazine’s final articles in March, titled “What are your tasks after the war?,” Wirsing 
called on Europe’s youth not to trust the Americans or the Soviets, and to rely only on themselves 
in rebuilding Europe.  Foreshadowing the future project of European integration, he called on all 
European youth to “renounce the narrow-minded repressions of exaggerated nationalism.” “The 
welfare of every individual European people,” he pleaded, “depends on the security of other na-
tions.”  The future of Europe, he was certain, would be a “united Europe.”185 His prediction was 
accurate, and, ironically, made possible only by the utter defeat of his homeland. 
On April 1, in face of the advancing Red Army, Wirsing fled Berlin.  Refusing Schellen-
berg’s offers to accompany him to Copenhagen, Wirsing instead travelled south toward Bavaria, 
reaching Bad Tölz at the end of April.  He was arrested there by U.S. authorities on June 1.186 
 
 The Americans who arrested Wirsing were less interested in his role as propagandist than 
in his role as author of the Egmont Reports.187  Most of the interrogations that took place over the 
next year concerned Wirsing’s relationship with Walter Schellenberg and his knowledge of the 
inner workings of the Foreign Office.  Although Wirsing was an SS-Sturmbannführer (Major) at 
war’s end, his interrogators concluded that his rank was largely symbolic.188  Nevertheless, later 
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reports heavily analyzed his collected writings, from Die Tat in 1930 to the Egmont Reports in 
1944-45.  While Wirsing had made few contributions to the policies and operations of the Nazi 
regime, one interrogator wrote that he had carried “an inordinately large share in laying the ideo-
logical foundations upon which the conservative elements of Germany could submerge their dis-
like” of Hitler; Wirsing had, in other words, justified the crimes of the Nazi regime.  In this respect, 
the interrogator concluded, Wirsing was an “intellectual war criminal.”189 
 The historian Ian Kershaw has argued that, unlike most European resistance movements 
during the war, the “resistance” of Germany’s conservatives in 1944 came the closest to actually 
affecting the outcome of the war.  This fact was due, in large part, to conservatives’ prominent role 
in the Nazi regime; their “resistance” was a resistance from above, Kershaw argues, a “resistance 
without the people.”190 The people who likely would have formed a grassroots resistance move-
ment against Hitler – socialists and communists from the working class – had been arrested, im-
prisoned in concentration camps, or executed long before the war.  Despite their outsized role in 
“resistance” near the war’s end, conservative elites had also helped make Nazism acceptable. Con-
servatives celebrated the demise of Weimar democracy. They applauded Hitler’s 1934 purge of 
the SA, the dismantling of the Versailles Treaty, the arms buildup, the Anschluss. Even worse, 
support for Hitler was still strong as late as 1941; many future “resistors” were complicit in war 
crimes and atrocities only two or three years before they would attempt to kill Hitler.191  
 Robert Paxton, an historian of Vichy, has argued that scholars should stop using the term 
“resistance” altogether in discussing German conservatives, preferring the term “opposition” in-
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stead.  These Germans, Paxton explains, were not dealing with a foreign occupation but with fel-
low Germans; unique to this situation were the constraints of patriotism and legitimacy.  Few of 
Hitler’s opponents “were willing to accept the defeat of the German Army or the overthrow of the 
German state as necessary for Hitler's removal.”192 Only as the Nazi regime grew evermore radical 
and destructive in the war’s final years, threatening Germany’s very existence, could conservatives 
comprehend overthrowing Hitler.  Paxton writes that, while conservative opposition late in the war 
was commendable, “the legitimacy these men offered Hitler's regime by working within it more 
than outweighed their opportunity to restrain things.”193  
 The situation faced by Giselher Wirsing and Max Clauss is perhaps more understandable 
in light of these arguments.  As conservatives, Wirsing and Clauss initially found it easy to meld 
their nationalistic views with Nazi ideology and to reconcile it with their European idealism, a 
synthesis of ideas on that would be on full display in Signal magazine over its five-year run.  Even 
as their doubts grew about Hitler over the course of the war, however, they remained deluded on 
some level. If Paxton is of any guidance here, one must speculate that it was difficult for Clauss 
and Wirsing to identify the Nazi Party and Germany as distinct and separate entities.  Even when 
Wirsing could identify Hitler as a threat to the German nation, the most he felt he could do was 
write a report that, by some miracle, might change the Führer’s mind.   
 The most troubling aspect of conservative “collaboration” with the Nazis is that it helped 
enable the murder of six million Jews.  Clauss and Wirsing chose to turn a blind eye to the Holo-
caust over the full course of the war.  Wirsing himself seemed to make peace with Nazi genocide 
altogether, continuing to write anti-Semitic tracts well into the war. 
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The next chapter follows the careers of André Zucca and Georges Lang, two Frenchmen 
who collaborated in the production of Signal between 1940 and 1944.  As stated in Chapter One, 
Signal magazine was not solely a German operation, but a European one, with publishing houses 
in Oslo, Paris, and Milan.  Especially pertinent in the Paris operation were the unique circum-
stances faced by the French who, more than any other occupied people, had the privilege of choos-
ing between collaboration, accommodation, and resistance.  André Zucca and Georges Lang, ded-
icated and successful professionals in Paris before the war, found themselves suddenly confronted 
with the German-occupation of their country and the prospect of lost livelihoods.  Rather than 
accepting personal ruin, however, Zucca and Lang agreed to conditions set by the Germans in 
working for Signal magazine – conditions which, in the case of Lang, indirectly threatened the 
lives of fellow Frenchmen. 
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Chapter 4: Between Collaboration and Survival 
 
“Consider, gentlemen, how unbearable the situation was for a man 
who loved his business as one loves his own family …. I did not 
spend four years being hunted by the Germans so that later the 
French could attack me!”194 
 
  – Georges Lang, Parisian publisher of Signal, May 14, 1946 
 
 
“Men have lost their sense of national duty to the point where they 
consider only the success of the company … [Collaboration] was 
just business to them.”195 
 
   – André Thirion, 19th Arr. Purge Committee, May 14, 1946 
 
  
In March 2008, a new photo exhibition opened at the Historical Library of the City of Paris, 
drawing tens of thousands of curious visitors.  The rare color photos in the exhibition depicted 
scenes of daily life in Paris during an earlier time; three fashionable women promenade through 
the Tuileries in extravagant hats, a couple bicycles through the Place de la Concorde, and a man 
feeds an elephant at the Zoo de Vincennes as smiling children and their mothers look on.  The 
photographs depicted the timeless essence of Parisian life; they were pleasant, escapist, almost 
innocuous.  Except they were taken between 1942 and 1943 during the height of the German oc-
cupation of France.  Suddenly, the “normality” of the photos becomes unpleasant and troublesome.  
Taken at a time when thousands of Parisian Jews were being deported, life in the photographs 
appears altogether not that bad, forcing some to ask, “Did the French suffer all that much under 
the occupation?”  Many visitors to the exhibit were offended by the photographs which, in their 
eyes, violated the sanctity of France’s suffering during the Second World War. 
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The exhibition “The Parisians under the Occupation” opened to a storm of controversy in 
Paris as no other photo exhibition had before, attracting criticism from private citizens and gov-
ernment officials alike.  “Where were the photos of the arrests,” visitors asked, “the deportations, 
the executions?”  Acknowledging who took the photos answered part of that question: the photog-
rapher, André Zucca, worked for the Nazi propaganda magazine Signal.  But the Historical Library 
failed to disclose Zucca’s occupation, a glaring omission that nearly forced the exhibition to close 
its doors.  Christophe Girard, the Deputy Mayor for Parisian Cultural Affairs, described the exhi-
bition as “indecent,” saying it made him want to “vomit.”  Determined to have it closed, Girard 
ordered that all posters advertising the exhibit around Paris be taken down.  When the controversy 
came before the city municipal council, however, then-Mayor Bertrand Delanoë intervened to save 
the exhibition, arguing that the only thing worse than white-washing history would be censoring 
it.  As part of a compromise with organizers, Mayor Delanoë asked the Historical Library to issue 
an avertissement (warning) for the exhibit and to distribute pamphlets at the front door identifying 
the photos as works of propaganda.196 The controversy, however, would simmer until late in the 
summer of 2008. 
Deputy Mayor Girard continued to describe the exhibit as “revisionist history,” with others 
attacking the photos as wholly unrepresentative of occupied Paris.  In an article on Zucca’s photos, 
the historian Mary Louise Roberts asks readers, “Are we forced to conclude from Zucca’s images 
that occupied Paris as a whole was not such a terrible place to be?”197  The answer: not exactly.  
Indeed, there are a number of unpleasant moments that creep into Zucca’s frame: hungry Parisians 
wait in line for food, crowds clog the streets of the city’s working-class underbelly, and a Jew 
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approaches the camera wearing the ominous yellow star with “Juif” emblazoned across the front.  
Zucca photographed these darker moments, but his focus, as propagandist, was on the wealthier, 
the more fashionable side of Paris. Aside from the obvious lack of traffic, Parisian life in Zucca’s 
photos appear strikingly normal – women show off the latest fashions at the races at Longchamps, 
teenagers enjoy an afternoon at the local pool, and social life at the cafés goes on unimpeded – that 
is, if we ignore the many German service members who enter the scene, whether they are leaving 
a show at the theater or attending Sunday mass at La Madaleine. As Roberts notes, “Zucca’s pas-
sion was a distinctly Parisian charm which even Nazi boots could not trample.”198  
A more appropriate title for the exhibit would have been “Des Parisiens sous l’Occupation” 
instead of “Les Parisiens sous l’Occupation;” “Some” Parisians instead of “The” Parisians.  The 
photos did not reveal a society that enjoyed occupation.  Rather, they revealed a society in which 
pleasure and joy lived in disturbingly close proximity to suffering and death.  In the guest book at 
the exhibition, one visitor remarked, “The main thing was not to be a Jew or a resistor (terrorists, 
they were called!). The theaters and concerts were practically free. We young people could take 
advantage of it.  Like eighty percent of the French, we never partook in politics.”199 
The Zucca photos opened old wounds for the French and provoked enduring agonies, not 
only over the history of the occupation in France, but over questions of how that history should be 
remembered.  To be sure, the photographer Zucca was a collaborator working for Signal, but his 
photos nonetheless highlighted a facet of the occupation often overshadowed by collaborators and 
resistors.  The vast majority of the French people simply tried to “get by” under occupation.  The 
war years in France are endlessly fascinating for historians precisely because the French had the 
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privilege – if by privilege, one means the relative safety of occupation in the West as compared to 
the East – to choose between collaboration, accommodation, or resistance, to make tough moral 
decisions that lacked any clarity.  This privilege was on display nowhere better than in the case of 
André Zucca.  While virtually all of Signal’s correspondents were German, the publisher 
Deutscher Verlag allowed Zucca, a Frenchman, to fill the role of official Paris correspondent for 
the magazine.  No such privilege was extended to other nationalities.  The question of morality 
was murky in the case of professionals, especially those who faced the threat of German requisi-
tion: were Frenchmen morally obligated to sacrifice their personal livelihoods in service to some 
national “duty,” or was collaboration with the Germans acceptable under such duress, even if that 
collaboration indirectly threatened the lives of others?  Visiting the cases of André Zucca, a pho-
tographer for Signal, and Georges Lang, Signal’s Parisian publisher, this chapter argues that deci-
sions to work with the Germans under occupation often defied the simple label of “collaboration.”  
For some professional or wealthy French men and women (probably most), the instinct for self-
preservation was more powerful than the instinct to resist.  Zucca and Lang fell into this category. 
 
 On June 14, 1940, the citizens of Paris awoke to the sight of German soldiers occupying 
their city, a sight they had not seen in nearly seventy years.  The situation had looked dire when 
Germany’s western offensive began on May 10, but few Parisians could have imagined that in 
little more than a month, German tanks would be clanking through their very streets.  Over the 
next four years, the French would look on in horror as the victorious Germans paraded daily down 
the Champs-Elysées.  Of the dozen or so countries that Germany invaded between 1938 and 1944, 
France had the singular ignominy of being the only great power to surrender to the upstart Nazi 
regime, a fact that was, in no small part, a source of humiliation and bitterness for the French.  In 
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one way or another, most Parisians grew accustomed to the thousands of German “tourists” who 
occupied their city, especially in the first two years of the war.  On June 23, photographers for 
Signal followed Paris’ most famous tourist, the Führer himself.  Hitler admired the grandeur of 
Paris and decided that he would annihilate the French capital not through aerial bombardment, but 
with German Kultur.  “I have often wondered whether we should simply destroy Paris,” he re-
marked to his architect, “but when we have finished Berlin, Paris will be nothing but its shadow. 
Then, why destroy it?”200 
 With the city falling to the Germans virtually unscathed, propagandists for the Wehrmacht 
moved to control all media in Paris.  Their job was not difficult to complete, as strict press controls 
had already been in place for nearly a year.  Using a law from July 1938 that regulated the distri-
bution of goods to various industries during wartime, the French government had imposed heavy 
censorship in 1939, most famously banning France’s communist press after the Nazi alliance with 
the Soviet Union in August 1939; the German authorities conveniently found the communist paper 
L’Humanité already banned when they arrived.201 Throughout June and July, the Germans quickly 
moved to seize and requisition the most important publishing houses.  On June 14, the Germans 
met with the directors of the major publisher Gallimard to begin discussions over the German 
requisition of the company.  On June 30, the Germans requisitioned the Messageries Hachette, the 
courier services of another major French publisher, Librairie Hachette.202 German control over the 
French press was formalized with the creation of the Propaganda-Abteilung Frankreich (PAF) on 
July 18.  In October, the PAF was placed under the command of the military government in France, 
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the Militärbefehlshaber in Frankreich (MBF).  Along with the MBF, the PAF moved its offices 
into the Hotel Majestic at 19 Avenue Kléber.203 
 The central mission of the PAF was to manage all culture, media, and arts in occupied 
France.  Receiving its directives from Berlin, the PAF in Paris delegated the tasks of controlling 
the press and disseminating propaganda to the Propaganda-Staffel, who oversaw a censorship ap-
paratus in each region of occupied France (excluding Alsace and Calais).204 Part of that task in-
cluded banning various publications and consolidating the press under a smaller group of papers 
that would be easier to control.  By 1943, the number of regular newspapers, journals, and maga-
zines in France had dropped from a pre-war number of 1,363 to only 796.  Over sixty percent of 
newspapers published in the northern occupied zone were banned by the Germans, while thirty 
percent of papers in the southern zone were banned following the German occupation in November 
1942.205 
 Among the most important assets in the hands of the Propaganda-Staffel was the Messa-
geries Hachette.  Before the German occupation, the Messageries had been, by far, the largest 
courier service in France, distributing over 160,000 tons of print media annually.  In Paris alone, 
the Messageries employed a team of nearly four hundred cyclists to distribute daily newspapers.206 
On June 30, 1940, the Germans met with the directors of Librairie Hachette to requisition the 
Messageries at 111 Rue Réaumur.  Rather than allow a full German requisition of the Messageries 
(and potentially the entire company), the directors offered their “collaboration” to the Germans in 
return for retaining French control, “d’accord pour une collaboration complète.”  After a period of 
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negotiations, the directors agreed to sell forty-nine percent of the company’s shares to the 
Propagnda-Staffel, leaving the other fifty-one percent in French hands.207 Over the next four years, 
the Messageries Hachette served as the main organ of propaganda distribution in France, including 
the distribution of Signal magazine.  In late 1940, Signal’s publisher Deutscher Verlag appointed 
a German businessman living in Paris, Alfons Geubels, to oversee Signal’s distribution in France.  
There at 111 Rue Réaumur, Geubels set up his own office as representative of Deutscher Verlag.208 
 Of course, in 1940, Deutscher Verlag was searching not only for a distributor for Signal, 
but also for a publisher.  With Germany now occupying Poland, Denmark, Norway, Holland, Bel-
gium, and France, Deutscher Verlag’s ability to keep up with the Wehrmacht’s increasing demand 
for copies of Signal was stretching thin.  In July 1940, Deutscher Verlag turned its attention toward 
a wealthy Parisian named Georges Lang and his publishing house, Imprimerie Georges Lang. 
 
 Founded in 1908 by a Jewish businessman from Lorraine, the Imprimerie Georges Lang 
was inherited by the founder’s son, Georges Lang fils, in 1919.  Over the next twenty years, the 
young and ambitious Lang built the business up from a small family enterprise into one of the 
largest publishing houses in France, its workforce growing from twenty employees in 1919 to over 
1,500 employees in 1939.209 The main printing presses were located at 11 Rue Curial in the nine-
teenth arrondissement of Paris.  In 1927, Lang used his multiplying wealth to open up an adjacent 
workshop at 41 Rue Archereau.  The workshop, named Helios-Archereau, employed the most 
advanced heliogravure machines of the period.  Heliogravure was a photo reproduction process 
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that allowed for the creation of large, colorful and glossy images – perfect for printing magazines, 
posters, and pictorial books.  As one of the few publishers in Paris specializing in heliogravure, 
Imprimerie Georges Lang secured a number of important contracts in the late 1920s and early 
1930s, printing books for Larousse, Librairie Hachette, and Gallimard.  By 1939, Imprimerie 
Georges Lang had built a business with vast resources, the most modern technology, and an annual 
turnover of eighty million francs.210 
 Lang took great pride in the business he had built, loving it as he loved “his own family.”211 
Any suggestion at his postwar trial that his personal wealth had been earned through less-than-
honest means drew sharp rebukes from Lang: 
This business began as the small business of my father. I am not a 
financier, I am not a man of the banks. I worked hard day in and day 
out. I set up this house, a business that I built up each year to reap 
the profits of the year before.212 
 
Lang, though never particularly religious, converted from Judaism to Catholicism as a young man 
to better assimilate into French society.  He married a Catholic woman and had two sons, born in 
1917 and 1920, both of whom were baptized as Catholics.213  Lang claimed an identity first and 
foremost as a businessman which informed his politics.  While generally staying above the raucous 
fray of French politics in the 1930s, he was not afraid to voice opinions.  He told his workers that 
he despised Léon Blum, the Front Populaire, and the “Marxist rabble.”  Despite his antipathy for 
the political left, however, Lang maintained business contracts with leftist political groups, even 
printing the monthly communist magazine Regards.  Business, in Lang’s eyes, always came before 
politics.  In 1936, he even became a member of the Comité France-Allemagne which promoted 
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closer economic ties between France and Germany, ties that he believed would be good for busi-
ness and that led to a business trip to Berlin in 1937.214 Ironically, it was Lang’s success as a 
businessman and his previous involvement with the Comité France-Allemagne that made him an 
attractive target for the Propaganda-Staffel. 
 When the Germans entered Paris on June 14, 1940, Lang closed the Imprimerie’s work-
shops and fled to the Parisian suburb of Louveciennes, north of Versailles.  Surprisingly for Lang, 
the Germans had allowed most publishers in Paris to continue operating under French manage-
ment.  Fearing that Imprimerie Georges Lang would fall behind its competitors, Lang reopened 
the workshops on July 18 and called a meeting with his board of directors to plan their next steps.  
The board consisted of: Raoul Dauvois (General Director), Robert Rime (Commercial Director), 
Philippe Le Bris (Deputy Commercial Director), and Lucien Philippe (Technical Director).215 
The imprimerie’s situation was precarious, Lang understood, because of his Jewish birth 
status.  Not only might the Germans attempt to “Aryanize” the business, but the Vichy regime 
could also put pressure on French businesses to pull out of their contracts with Jewish publishers.  
In a letter prepared for the Germans (a letter he would later come to regret), Lang recognized 
Germany as the “victorious” power, spoke of his conversion to Catholicism, reflected on his close 
relationship with Germans through the Comité France-Allemagne, and emphasized the scale of his 
business’ assets.216  Was this letter an implicit offer of collaboration with the Germans?  Surely, 
Lang reasoned, the Germans would call on the services of his printing presses sooner or later, and 
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it was better to keep the business under his own control rather than German management.  In other 
words, the letter was an insurance policy. 
The Germans were, in fact, already eyeing Imprimerie Georges Lang before the letter was 
composed.  A director for Deutscher Verlag, Dr. Matuschke, was sent from Berlin to Paris in 
search of a publishing house capable of meeting the monthly demand for Signal magazine in 
France.  Only three publishers were identified by Dr. Matuschke: Imprimerie Desfossés-Néogra-
vure, Imprimerie Créteil, and Imprimerie Georges Lang.  As it turned out, Desfossés had been 
bombed during the invasion and Créteil was too far from central Paris, leaving Imprimerie Georges 
Lang as the only option.217 
On July 27, Dr. Matuschke and a member of the Propaganda-Staffel, Lieutenant Schmidt, 
paid a visit to Lang’s workshops.  Philippe Le Bris, the factory’s deputy commercial director, met 
with Matuschke and Schmidt and gave them a tour of the workshops, where they were impressed 
by the scale of production, the modernity of the printing presses, and the heliogravure workshop – 
vital for producing photo magazines like Signal.  Following the tour, Matuschke and Schmidt met 
with Lang and his other directors, Rime and Dauvois.  Against Lang’s hopes, the Germans did not 
offer the Imprimerie Georges Lang a contract to print propaganda; instead, they offered to buy out 
fifty-one percent of the business’ shares.  They knew of Lang’s Jewish birth-status, but offered to 
leave him as chief administrator and declare him an aryen d’honneur – an honorary Aryan.  “It’s 
not for sale,” Lang bluntly replied.  He was prepared to do business with the Germans, but he was 
not prepared relinquish his printing presses and his inventory in the process.  Exasperated, the two 
Germans then threatened Lang with a complete requisition.  If Lang would not agree to sell half 
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of the business, the Propaganda-Staffel would be “obliged to commandeer the factory.”  Intimi-
dated but not persuaded, Lang dismissed the two Germans, a move applauded by his employees.218 
The promise to requisition the factory was not an idle threat, however.  On August 30, a 
month after his initial visit, Lt. Schmidt again visited Imprimerie Georges Lang, this time to inform 
Lang that his machines and inventory would be requisitioned.  Since Lang was of Jewish origin, 
the Imprimerie was classified as a Jüdisches Geschäft by the Germans, making it liable for a req-
uisition and the installation of a German administrator.219 Lang was asked to step down as the 
business’ head immediately.  On September 1, 1940, Imprimerie Georges Lang was officially re-
named Imprimerie Curial-Archereau, and, later that month, the Germans appointed two adminis-
trators to replace Lang’s board of directors: Sonderführer Cordes of the Propaganda-Staffel and 
Jean-Ferdinand De Roover, a Belgian businessman.220  Philippe Le Bris, Lang’s deputy commer-
cial director, was appointed by Cordes and De Roover to oversee the factory’s day-to-day opera-
tions, possibly because Le Bris spoke fluent German. 
As the Germans had technically only requisitioned the factory’s machines and inventory, 
Georges Lang and his directors Robert Rime and Raoul Dauvois still maintained shares in the 
business.  All three men, in fact, still worked at the factory, albeit no longer as directors.  Lang, 
ever the businessman, became determined to take back his factory: 
From that moment, what was my thought? Obviously, to reconquer 
the house and drive out the Germans. I could not hide, I could not 
leave my house. I had only one thought: to tear it from the Ger-
mans.221 
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On October 3, 1940, the first Vichy racial law was passed banning Jews from the civil service, the 
military, and all commercial activities (including the press).  Lang was driven out of the factory at 
Rue Curial the following day.  On October 10, Lang announced to Rime and Dauvois that he was 
relinquishing all of his remaining duties to them, fearing that the “religion of his father” might 
prove detrimental to the business.222  Although Imprimerie Georges Lang – now Imprimerie Cu-
rial-Archereau – was in German hands, it had technically not been “Aryanized” since the Germans 
had not bought out the company’s shares; rather, they were “occupying” the factory space.  With 
Lang now out of frame and the threat of German capital entering the business temporarily post-
poned, Rime and Dauvois began contacting French clients and urging them to move their business 
out of Imprimerie Curial-Archereau and to a separate Lang property.  Sonderführer Cordes, how-
ever, soon discovered their scheme.  On November 6, the partial requisition of the factory became 
a réquisition totale, and Rime and Dauvois were forced off the premises.223 
 Throughout the autumn of 1940 and the spring of 1941, Philippe Le Bris was the only 
French director to continue working under the Germans.  Lang corresponded with Le Bris, asking 
him to do everything in his power to slow down German works.  Le Bris ignored Lang’s corre-
spondence, as well as his demands to hand over files on French clients to Rime and Dauvois.  
Under the direct supervision of the Propaganda-Staffel, Le Bris likely had little room to follow 
Lang’s requests.224  In October 1940, Imprimerie Curial-Archereau began printing the first issues 
of Signal, printing over two million copies by year’s end.  In December, a “secret workshop” was 
also established at 14 Rue Curial in an annex to the main factory building.  Taking up a space of 
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roughly three-thousand square feet, the secret workshop was employed by the Gestapo to print 
various logbooks, administrative manuals, and directories for its members stationed in France.225 
 Over the course of six months between October 1940 and April 1941, Georges Lang sought 
out various officials in Paris to help him end the requisition of his factory, a requisition he believed 
was illegal.  He contacted the Ministry of Commerce, the Ministry of Industrial Production, the 
Prefect of the Seine, and the President of the Commercial Court – all to no avail.  The Vichy laws 
were explicit that a Jew could not manage the factory. 
 In late April 1941, Lang contacted his friend Daniel Imhaus at Librairie Larousse, a former 
client, to discuss the possibility of an “Aryanization” of Imprimerie Curial-Archereau.  At the time, 
Lang still owned a major portion of the business’ shares even though the Germans had requisi-
tioned his workshops.  This allowed the business to be classified as “Jewish,” justifying the Ger-
mans’ continued requisition.  Lang proposed to Imhaus a deal in which all of Lang’s shares would 
be sold to Imhaus, an Aryan.  With Imhaus in charge of the business, the Germans could classify 
it as Aryanized, allowing French management to take back control of the factory.226 In May 1941, 
Imhaus, acting on behalf of Lang, began negotiations with the Propaganda-Staffel to Aryanize 
Imprimerie Curial-Archereau, placing its workshops back under French management.  What Lang 
and Imhaus did not know at the time was that Germany was preparing to invade the Soviet Union 
and recalling thousands of soldiers and reserve officers from France, a state of affairs that made 
the Germans more willing to hand over its management of the factory.  On May 15, the Propa-
ganda-Staffel agreed to the terms set by Imhaus and Lang, but presented their own list of terms to 
be met by Imhaus for the transfer of management to take place: first, to keep the name Imprimerie 
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Curial-Archereau; second, to continue printing Signal magazine for the Deutscher Verlag; third, 
to print all publications assigned by the Propaganda-Staffel; and fourth, to continue funding and 
supplying the “secret workshop.”227 On June 9, the directors Rime and Dauvois agreed to transfer 
the business’ shares from Lang to Imhaus and to meet the conditions set by the Germans.228 In 
August, Lang officially signed over control of Imprimerie Curial-Archereau to Imhaus and severed 
all ties from the business.229 The official transfer of the factory from the Propaganda-Staffel to 
Daniel Imhaus took place on August 19, and Sonderführer Cordes was transferred out of Paris to 
the Eastern Front.230 
 Georges Lang’s departure from Imprimerie Curial-Archereau coincided with increasing 
economic pressure on the Jews of Paris.  Lang resided with his wife in Louveciennes until Novem-
ber 1941, when he assumed the false name Gaston Lambert and slipped across the line of demar-
cation into France’s southern unoccupied zone.  Living first in Clermont-Ferrand and later Lyon, 
Lang worked for two separate papers under his assumed name and with the assistance of a personal 
friend.231  In November 1942, as the Germans moved to occupy the southern zone, Lang fled with 
his wife once more, this time across the Swiss border.  There in Switzerland, he would wait out 
the war in Lausanne on Lake Geneva.232 
 While the workers of Imprimerie Curial-Archereau had applauded Lang’s rebuff of the 
Germans in July 1940, they were appalled ten months later by the Aryanization agreement between 
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the directors and the Propaganda-Staffel.  “These [directors] categorically refused to place them-
selves at the disposal of the Germans,” one typographer recalled, “I asked myself how it was pos-
sible that in June 1941, these same men could agree to do the work of the Germans.”  Another 
employee commented that the workers were “ashamed” to have a Gestapo office running out of 
the factory.233 What angered workers the most, however, were the deteriorating working conditions 
at the factory, conditions they believed their French directors were complicit in creating.  By 1943, 
the factory was printing over 800,000 copies of Signal per issue, requiring workers in the helio-
gravure shop to work sixty-five-hour work weeks with decreased wages.234 
 Over the course of the occupation, the directors of Imprimerie Curial-Archereau oversaw 
a massive printing operation that worked almost exclusively with German propaganda and far-
right French papers.  In addition to Signal magazine, the factory printed such works as Die Wehr-
macht (a military-themed magazine), Voix Ouvrière, Hop et Voilà, Femmes Françaises, and Union 
Française.235 The factory also accepted a contract with Jacques Doriot’s Parti Populaire Français, 
printing various books and pamphlets for the fascist group.236 The most controversial agreement, 
however, was the decision by the directors to continue funding the “secret workshop,” where 
French workers printed Gestapo logbooks, directories, propaganda pamphlets and posters, and lists 
of known resistance members in France.  The workshop’s small staff, segregated from the workers 
in the main factory building, were hired and sworn to secrecy by the Gestapo.  Nevertheless, its 
workers were paid by Imprimerie Curial-Archereau and received their paper supply and machines 
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from the main factory as well.237 The secret workshop at Imprimerie Curial-Archereau would leave 
its mark on France printing the infamous affiches des fusillés, plastered on the walls of the Paris 
Métro and on public buildings throughout France, demanding the capture of French “terrorists” – 
members of the resistance.238 As it turned out, many of those denounced on paper supplied by the 
Imprimerie Curial-Archereau would be arrested and executed by the Germans. 
 The Parisian collaboration with Signal magazine from 1940 to 1944 involved more than 
simply publishers and couriers.  Throughout the occupation, a number of political figures, journal-
ists, and photographers contributed articles to the magazine.  The French cartoonist and caricaturist 
Anton Sailer, for example, was even given his own office at Deutscher Verlag’s Paris headquarters.  
Despite being a German operation, Deutscher Verlag hired a handful of Frenchmen to work as 
regular contributors for Signal, a privilege not extended to any other nationality.  Among those 
select-Frenchmen was photographer and Paris correspondent André Zucca, the only regular, non-
German correspondent for the magazine. 
 
 André Zucca was born in 1897 as the only child of an Italian mother, a seamstress.  He had 
no memory of his father, who refused to recognize him as his son.  The father soon abandoned 
Zucca’s mother, leaving her to raise the young André alone and in poverty.  Zucca spent his youth 
in Paris until 1911 when, at the age of fourteen, he and his mother immigrated to the United States.  
There, he lived in New York with his mother and three uncles who had found success in the city.  
Years later, Zucca’s daughter Nicole would recall her father’s lifelong fondness for America, a 
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fondness which stemmed from his early years in New York.  Whatever the reason (it remains 
unclear), Zucca returned to France in 1915 at the age of seventeen and enlisted in the French Army.  
At the Battle of Verdun in 1916, Zucca received extensive wounds and lost the use of a lung, a 
sacrifice for which he was awarded the Croix de Guerre.239  Despite the injury, he remained in the 
military until the end of the war in 1918, after which he returned to Paris and worked various odd 
jobs.  Zucca eventually picked up photography, first as a hobby and later as a career.  For most of 
the 1920s, Zucca worked as a portrait photographer for the theater and film review Comœdia.240  
 Zucca’s success in photography grew throughout the 1920s and 1930s as he expanded his 
work to the papers Paris-Soir and L’Illustration.  In 1935, he made his first foreign reports from 
Italy, Yugoslavia, and Greece.  In 1937, he boarded a cargo ship at Le Havre and travelled from 
France to the Mediterranean, the Suez Canal, and eventually Japan.  Long stopovers along the 
route allowed Zucca to photograph and write reports from Greece, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, 
Egypt, Yemen, Singapore, Indochina, China, and Japan.241 Upon his return to France in 1938, he 
became a photographer for the French magazine Match and sold some of his reports to the British 
magazine Picture Post.  Zucca’s photos from the 1930s give little impression of any ideological 
underpinnings.  When not photographing peasant life and cultural scenes from abroad, he was 
photographing street scenes in Paris as well as bodybuilders, acrobats, ballet dancers, and actors.242 
At the outbreak of war in 1939, Zucca was attached as a photographer and war correspondent to 
the press service of the Deuxième Bureau, France’s intelligence agency, where he spent the winter 
of 1939-1940 in Karelia reporting on the Winter War between Finland and the Soviet Union.  In 
the spring of 1940, he returned to France where he covered the drôle de guerre, photographing the 
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mundane lives of French soldiers at the Maginot Line.  In one of Zucca’s more memorable photo-
graphs, French soldiers posed mockingly in front of a captured swastika flag.243  While comical, 
the photo was also foreboding; in only a few months, Zucca would be photographing the same flag 
adorning public buildings and monuments throughout Paris. 
 Of all the professions to be censored by the Germans during the occupation, one of the 
hardest hit was photography.  Fearing photographers would act as agents of the Allied intelligence 
services, the Germans issued an ordinance on September 16, 1940 prohibiting all outdoor photog-
raphy in the occupied zone.  With the film market strictly regulated by the Germans, all profes-
sional photographers had to obtain and regularly renew their press credentials with the Propa-
ganda-Staffel in order to gain access to film.  Under this new ordinance, many photographers who 
worked outside of the press were unable to support themselves.  As if the restriction on outdoor 
photography had not been bad enough, the Germans also required that all works of photography 
be submitted to and approved by the Propaganda-Staffel before publishing.244  André Zucca found 
these new regulations to be suffocating, but thanks to his continued work for L’Illustration, he still 
maintained access to film and a regular, albeit decreased, salary. 
 On July 28, 1941, Zucca was contacted by Anton Sailer from Deutscher Verlag requesting 
his professional services for Signal magazine.  The magazine’s editors had done reports from Paris 
before, but they were now looking for a regular correspondent to report on the city and on France.  
Zucca’s photography for Paris-Soir and L’Illustration made him an ideal candidate for Signal 
magazine.  “Your reputation as a photographer has been known to us for a long time,” Sailer wrote, 
“and we hope that your work for our Edition will be inspired by your previous works.”245 Zucca 
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quickly accepted the offer.  As a correspondent for Signal, Zucca received 16,000 francs per month 
and an Ausweis (ID card) from the German authorities, which allowed him to photograph outdoor 
scenes in Paris and northern France without restriction.  He also received new Rolleiflex and Leica 
cameras, rolls of black and white film, and extremely rare rolls of Agfacolor film.246 Agfa, part of 
the IG Farben group, had been a fierce competitor with the American film company Eastman Ko-
dak before the war.  In response to the development of the Technicolor and Kodachrome processes, 
Agfa developed its own Agfacolor process.247  The war removed Agfa’s major competitors, but 
the stock of color film in Europe would remain low throughout the early 1940s.  In accepting his 
work for Signal, Zucca became one in only a handful of professionals in Western Europe with 
access to color film.248 
 Over the next three years, Zucca operated out of a photo-lab and office at his home at 8 
Rue Changarnier in the twelfth arrondissement.  There, he received regular assignments from 
Deutscher Verlag that required him to travel throughout France for brief periods of time.  Among 
his first assignments was photographing the private home of Vichy’s head of state, Maréchal Pé-
tain.  Other assignment topics included fascist youth camps in Vichy, the arrival of French POWs 
returned from Germany, and Frenchmen of the Légion des volontaires français (LVF) departing 
France for the Eastern Front.  Zucca’s most common assignment, however, involved photo-
graphing the destruction wrought by Allied bombing raids over France.249 In a report dated March 
8, 1943, Zucca photographed the Allied destruction of French homes in Rennes, which had resulted 
in dozens of deaths.  Zucca captioned the report, “The Liberators came through here! The military 
objectives of the Allies in France,” an ironic title intended to spark public outrage against Allied 
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bombing raids.250 When he was not working on assigned reports, Zucca was using the perks of his 
position to do his own freelance photography, photographing street scenes in Paris – most of which 
would comprise the controversial 2008 exhibition “The Parisians under the Occupation.”  
Throughout his assigned reporting and freelance work, Zucca’s camera never shied away from the 
darker aspects of the occupation in France, whether it was Parisian Jews wearing the yellow star 
or LVF members posing with a scrawled message reading “Mort aux Juifs!” – “Death to the Jews!”  
Of course, such images were never included in Signal by its editors. 
 Without a doubt, Zucca’s reports carried great propaganda value for Signal, and officials 
at Deutscher Verlag were initially pleased with his photographs.  Over the course of his three-year 
career, however, Zucca seemed to grow disinterested, even repulsed, by his assignments.  His post-
liberation court records contain a series of increasingly angry letters from Anton Sailer at 
Deutscher Verlag, upset over the diminishing quality and quantity of Zucca’s work.  In September 
1942, Sailer complained about Zucca’s subpar effort on a recent report and warned him, “you seem 
to take your homework too lightly…Please know that we are not ignorant of what you are capable 
of.”251  In a subsequent letter, Sailer wrote more bluntly, “you have not acted in the interest of 
Signal.”252  By late 1943, Zucca was submitting many of his reports late or simply failing to report 
at all.  He blamed his tardiness on health issues stemming from his lung injury at Verdun in 1916.  
An exasperated Sailer wrote to Zucca blasting his truant behavior and demanding a doctor’s note 
with the “date of illness” and the “time needed for a cure.”253  Sailer sent Zucca his most biting 
letter in March 1944: 
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I hope not to be compelled to follow up on your unseemly discipline, 
which consists of leaving abruptly and following a protocol of your 
own liking. For the fourth time in thirty months, you have presented 
me with your resignation. This behavior is intolerable, and I beg you 
to remember that you are required…to lend your professional skill 
to the Deutscher Verlag. You are absolutely not allowed to act on 
your own whim and fancy. I grant you forty-eight hours to reflect 
on the consequences of your indiscipline and to relax your nervous 
system which I advise you to monitor more carefully.254 
 
Despite offering multiple resignations, Zucca continued to photograph for Signal until the very 
end of the occupation.  His final report to appear in the magazine was from the Parisian funeral of 
Philippe Henriot, a Vichy propagandist once nicknamed the “French Goebbels,” at the Hôtel de 
Ville in July 1944.255 
 As quickly as it had begun, the German occupation of Paris melted away in late August 
1944.  To be sure, sporadic shooting and street battles ensued throughout Paris in the final days of 
occupation, but the city fell to the Allied armies with relatively little resistance from German 
forces.  The French capital had cheated death once again, escaping the horrific fate met by other 
great cities such as Rotterdam and Warsaw.  The transition from occupation to liberation occurred 
seamlessly in Zucca’s photographs, the clearest example being a photograph of the Rue de Rivoli 
in September 1944, its focus on a column adorned by a Union Jack.  Only weeks earlier, Zucca 
had photographed from the same spot, its focus then being on a Nazi swastika flag.  Zucca contin-
ued photographing public spaces and cafés in the autumn of 1944, his frame no longer filled by 
Germans but by Americans and Brits.  Scanning through his collected œuvre at the Archives na-
tionales de France – thousands of photographs on four reels of microfilm – one gets a sense of 
Zucca not as a partisan or ideologue, but as a documentarian.  The occupation and liberation did 
not interrupt Zucca’s freelance work.  Only months after photographing German officers at a chic 
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Parisian café, Zucca was photographing portraits of resistance fighters such as Colonel Henri Rol-
Tanguy.256 While Zucca looked forward to continuing his career in a postwar France, however, his 
neighbors at 8 Rue Changarnier refused to forget his activities during the occupation.   
In early October 1944, the police station of the Quartier du Bel-Air received a letter accus-
ing a local photographer of collaboration with the Germans.  Included with the letter were two 
issues of Signal magazine.  The magazines contained reports on Allied bombings over Paris and a 
headline screaming “Montmartre sous les bombes!”  One dramatic photo depicted a mother and 
father grieving over the coffin of their deceased son.  Beneath the photo was the name of the 
photographer underlined in red: André Zucca.257  
On October 10, Zucca was apprehended at his apartment and detained at the Bel-Air police 
station.  Three of Zucca’s neighbors were brought in for questioning.  For years, they had watched 
Zucca suspiciously as he acquired wealth from his work for the Germans.  “The Zucca household 
materially improved during the occupation,” one neighbor asserted to the police commissioner.258  
Wealth was a major fixation of the neighbors: Zucca had used his income from Signal to create a 
photo-lab inside his home, they claimed, and, in 1942, he had bought a country estate outside the 
commune of Dreux.  The portrait his neighbors painted depicted not only a man of greed, but a 
man of deep political sympathies with the Germans.  One neighbor told police that, while he had 
only ever spoken with Zucca on a few occasions, Zucca had come across to him as a “Germano-
phile.”  On one occasion, during the repatriation of French POWs to France in 1942, Zucca had 
invited the neighbor into his apartment to look at photographs of smiling, healthy French prisoners.  
“Zucca commented that Hitler had made a magnificent gesture which the French did not seem to 
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appreciate,” he recalled.  Madame Beauvillian, a housewife living next door, went even further, 
telling police that Zucca had celebrated members of Vichy as “great Frenchmen.”  She accused 
Zucca and his wife of laying flowers at the funeral of Philippe Henriot in July 1944 and claimed 
that Zucca personally congratulated the son of a colleague on joining the Waffen-SS.259 
Zucca, whose interrogation took place after that of his neighbors, immediately took credit 
for his reports in Signal.  When presented with the testimony of his neighbors, however, Zucca 
fervently denied accusations of greed and sympathy with the Germans, claiming his neighbors had 
given exaggerated accounts.  While his wife had indeed accompanied him to the funeral of Philippe 
Henriot, for example, she never laid flowers at the event.  Likewise, Zucca admitted to praising 
Hitler to a neighbor, but attempted to clarify his statement: 
It is true that I published the first report of the arrival of the first 
prisoners repatriated to France. I was struck by the euphoria of the 
soldiers, and it was thus that I could tell my neighbor that Hitler had 
made a fine gesture by freeing them. I changed my mind afterward 
when I realized that this release was only meant to hype up the 
French.260 
 
He had agreed to work for Signal not from greed or political sympathy, Zucca told the police, but 
because he was secretly working for Allied intelligence.  After his time as a photographer with the 
Deuxième Bureau in the spring of 1940, Zucca claimed he had maintained contacts within French 
intelligence and that he had occasionally used his press credentials to snap photos of occupied 
Paris, which were then clandestinely transferred to Allied intelligence in Switzerland. He had ac-
cepted the offer to work for Signal, Zucca claimed, so that he could continue providing photo-
graphs.261 The following day, Colonel Antoine Moyen, a staff member at the Ministry of War and 
personal friend of Zucca’s from his time with the Deuxième Bureau, visited the Bel-Air police 
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station and testified on Zucca’s behalf, stating he had indeed made contact with French intelligence 
during the occupation.  The police cast serious doubt on Zucca’s claims, of which, aside from the 
testimony of Colonel Moyen, no physical proof existed.  Because they had little evidence against 
Zucca aside from neighborhood gossip, however, and because of the pleading of Colonel Moyen, 
the police decided to release Zucca.  Colonel Moyen assured the police Zucca would not attempt 
to flee justice.262 
 In late October, the police turned over Zucca’s case to the court system, having determined 
that, regardless of any aid he had provided to Allied intelligence, his work for Signal was still a 
significant contribution to German propaganda in France.  The case was received not by a Court 
of Justice but by a lesser civic court.263  Throughout the immediate post-liberation period in France, 
the French Provisional Government launched an épuration legale – a legal purge – in an attempt 
to rid society of those who had betrayed the French nation.  While the Courts of Justice tried the 
most serious cases of collaboration, handing down over six-thousand death sentences in the pro-
cess, the civic courts tried lesser cases of “unpatriotic behavior,” the punishment of which could 
include indignité nationale (resulting in a prison sentence) or dégradation nationale (resulting in 
the loss of civil rank or profession).264  Reviewing his case, the civic court decided not to bring 
Zucca to trial.  On November 13, citing evidence and testimony provided by the police, the court 
declared that Zucca had indeed engaged in collaboration with the Germans for Signal magazine.  
Because of his service in the First World War and the testimony of Colonel Moyen, however, the 
court ruled that Zucca should not face imprisonment.265 The next day, on November 14, the court 
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informed Zucca that he had received a dégradation nationale.266  He would be permanently banned 
from working in the press. 
 Zucca’s work for Signal magazine had undeniably contributed to the German cause in 
France.  Photo-reports on Allied bombing raids and French civilian deaths were among the most 
potent tools of German propaganda during the occupation.  Although most Frenchmen still hoped 
for an eventual Allied victory over the Germans, reports on Allied bombings succeeded in fostering 
a sense of wariness, even resentment, toward Americans and Brits among certain pockets of the 
French population.267 Zucca’s collaboration had, in other words, sapped national morale.  It was a 
shameful act in a time of national crisis, to be sure, but not a heinous crime.  Other Frenchmen 
who faced the épuration legale had been accused of far worse, of directly or indirectly endangering 
the lives of fellow Frenchmen.  Such were the accusations leveled against Imprimerie Curial-
Archereau and its former owner Georges Lang. 
 
 On September 28, 1944, Georges Lang returned to Paris from his two-year exile in Swit-
zerland and immediately reclaimed the Imprimerie Curial-Archereau, taking over from Daniel Im-
haus as its head administrator.  For Lang, the return to Paris and to his business was bittersweet.  
Only weeks before his return, his son fighting in the Second Armored Division under General 
Leclerc had been killed in battle.  Still mourning the death, Lang was determined to settle scores 
with his rivals, including the man whom he had blamed for selling out the business to the Germans, 
Philippe Le Bris.  Le Bris was the only director to remain at the factory throughout the entire period 
                                                          
266 Archives nationales de France, Z/6NL/118, Dossier 2908, Lettre de Monsieur Olmi, Juge d’Instruction, à la Cour 
de Justice (14 novembre 1944). 
267 Anglo-American Propaganda Progress in France, 23 September 1942. Military Intelligence Division Regional 
File, 1922-1944, France, Box 805. Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs, Record Group 165. 
NARA, College Park, MD. 
96 
 
of German requisition from September 1940 to August 1941.  On October 3, Lang invited Le Bris 
into his office where he harangued him on matters of “loyalty.”  Rather than defy the Germans, 
Lang argued, Le Bris had stood by as the Germans requisitioned the factory, forcibly removed 
Lang and his directors, and began printing propaganda.  He gave Le Bris two options: resign from 
his position immediately or risk being reported to an épuration committee.  Le Bris refused to 
resign.268  The next day, on October 4, Lang gathered the factory’s personnel for a meeting (or 
rather a speech) where, in no uncertain terms, he denounced Le Bris as a traitor: 
There are those of us here who are French and others who are not; 
among these I will name one: Le Bris. If Monsieur Le Bris claims 
to have supported me, he supported me only as a rope supports the 
hanged.269 
 
In what would prove a fateful decision, Lang denounced Philippe Le Bris as a collaborator to the 
Épuration Committee of the Nineteenth Arrondissement.  Heading the investigation of Le Bris was 
a man named André Thirion. 
 Thirion was a member of the French Communist Party who, before the liberation, had been 
a leading member of the resistance in Paris as head of the Clandestine Liberation Committee of 
the nineteenth arrondissement.  Now, as head of the district’s épuration committee, Thirion was 
determined to root out the collaborators in his midst.  After receiving a tip from Lang, Thirion 
launched an official investigation into the Imprimerie Curial-Archereau, digging through internal 
documents to collect evidence against Philippe Le Bris.  In the process, Thirion came across doc-
uments that, in his eyes, implicated the entire board of directors in collaboration, including Georges 
Lang.  Among the most damning documents was the letter written by Lang on July 22, 1940, 
appealing to Germany as the “victorious” power.  Thirion was shocked:  
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There was only one thing to do: ask the police to arrest the concerned 
persons and put them to justice. This is typically the definition of 
economic collaboration, and we could not approve it.270 
 
The épuration committee began building a case against Georges Lang and his directors.  The first 
arrest, that of Philippe Le Bris, took place on October 24.271  Other arrests came in quick succes-
sion: Daniel Imhaus, Robert Rime, Raoul Dauvois, and a handful of lower-level managers.  Since 
Lang was technically absent when the “collaboration” had taken place, he was not arrested but 
instead asked by Thirion to step down as head of the business.  By November 22, 1944, the entire 
upper-management of the company had either been arrested or forced to resign.  Charged by 
Thirion with printing “the vilest propaganda” against France, the directors were sent to Fresnes, 
where they were imprisoned until the start of a trial.272 With the management of the Imprimerie 
Curial-Archereau essentially decapitated, De Gaulle’s Provisional Government appointed the Min-
ister of Industrial Production, the socialist Robert Lacoste, to act as temporary administrator of the 
company.273 
 Following the arrests of the Imprimerie Curial-Archereau’s directors, there then arose the 
problem of how to pursue a case against them.  Unlike most épuration cases, which typically in-
volved individual collaborators, the case of Imprimerie Curial-Archereau was not resolved by a 
trial at the Court of Justice but by a committee; accusations of economic collaboration within var-
ious industries were investigated and tried by special épuration committees.  As journalist Alan 
Riding notes, “These trials could be incestuous affairs since, not infrequently, the judges and the 
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judged knew each other well and may have worked together before the war.”  Often, the commit-
tees were predisposed toward lenient sentences, fearing that a harsh punishment could set a prec-
edent and lead to a proliferation of investigations throughout the industry.274 With the management 
still in prison at Fresnes, the Trade Union Federation of Publishers in France deliberated what to 
do with the Imprimerie Curial-Archereau case.  It was not until October of 1945 that the case was 
transferred to the Commission nationale interprofessionnelle d'épuration (CNIE).  Testimony be-
gan in December 1945, but the main hearings would not take place until May 1946.275 During the 
hearings against the directors of Imprimerie Curial-Archereau, the CNIE considered not one but 
two separate cases: the first against the directors who ran the factory during the occupation and the 
second against Georges Lang who had arranged the Aryanization of his business. 
 The first hearing took place on May 7, 1946, scrutinizing the collaboration of Philippe Le 
Bris, Robert Rime, and Raoul Dauvois.  Rather than passively accepting German demands, the 
three men had been accused by Thirion of actively developing friendly relationships with the Ger-
mans in order to profit financially.  For Thirion, building a case against the directors was relatively 
straightforward.  Dozens of workers had come forward to testify against their former bosses; not 
one volunteered to defend them.  The workers’ primary accusation against the directors was not of 
greed, but of harsh treatment.  One worker accused the directors of instituting “policies eerily 
similar to those of the Gestapo.”276 Workers particularly resented the exception made with the 
German authorities to allow work on Sundays.  When hourly production rates fell below a thou-
sand magazines per machine, the directors alerted German guards, who used Luger pistols and 
snarling German shepherds to threaten workers.  One worker recalled an incident in which the 
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Gestapo ransacked his apartment after a director accused him of attempting to sabotage the pro-
duction of Signal.  While the workers of Imprimerie Curial-Archereau worked under threat with 
longer hours and “starvation salaries,” the directors held regular lunches with members of the 
Propaganda-Staffel at high-end restaurants.  “We will never forget the posters of murdered hos-
tages and death threats made against the resistance,” Thirion bitterly testified, “while company 
management…feasted with German officers.”277 The directors had not only “enjoyed” the occu-
pation, Thirion argued, but also profited.  One director had reportedly told a worker, “It is imper-
ative that the Germans win the war.  With them, we have everything we need to work.”278 
 Surprisingly, the directors did not attempt to deny many of the accusations made against 
them.  Their defense rested primarily on the claim that they were trying to save their workers; more 
important than sabotaging Signal, they argued, was preventing the deportation of workers to Ger-
many.279  Indeed, during the occupation, the Germans had attempted to “maximize” industrial ef-
ficiency in France in order to free up more labor which could be sent to Germany.  As the Germans 
bought out and consolidated printing presses throughout France, thousands of workers were laid 
off.  The estimated publishing workforce in France fell from around 30,000 in 1939 to 15,800 in 
1943.  Many of these workers were subsequently conscripted into the Service du travail obligatoire 
(STO) and sent to Germany as forced labor.280 A lawyer representing directors Rime and Dauvois 
presented the committee with documents from the German authorities demanding that 501 of the 
factory’s 1,500 workers be conscripted into the STO.281  Despite the heavy work load placed on 
Imprimerie Curial-Archereau, the lawyer noted, the factory could have functioned with only a 
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thousand workers.  Nevertheless, the directors “deceived” the Germans into believing the extra 
work was necessary.  Of the 501 workers requested by the Germans, the lawyer claimed, only 82 
had been deported to Germany.  In other words, 419 workers were saved “thanks to the work of 
Imhaus, Rime, and Dauvois.”282 Thirion called this claim into question, however, citing the threats 
of deportation made by the directors as evidence of their disregard for the workers.  The directors 
collaborated with the Germans not to shield their workers from German abuse, but to profit.283 
 The question which then arose was whether or not Imprimerie Curial-Archereau printed, 
primarily, French or German publications.  The directors contended that they had not collaborated 
to profit and that they had, in fact, lost money.  While it was true that profits had decreased during 
the war, the factory still weathered the occupation comparatively better than most other publishers.  
As French businesses suffered from German exploitation, exorbitant supply prices, and heavy ra-
tioning, these problems remained foreign to the Imprimerie Curial-Archereau, which enjoyed in-
creased quotas on paper, electricity, and oil.284 Why did the factory receive increased quotas?  Be-
cause, Thirion explained, its primary client was the Germans, not the French.  The Germans had 
stipulated that publishers printing primarily French works could receive only forty percent of the 
paper they used before the war.  Various workers testified that the directors gave Signal precedence 
over French publications.285  Even while the paper supply in France plummeted eighty percent 
between 1940 and 1944, the production rate for Signal magazine doubled over the same period, 
from 420,000 per issue in 1940 to 850,000 per issue in 1944.286 
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 Ultimately, the committee found Philippe Le Bris, Robert Rime, and Raoul Dauvois guilty 
of economic collaboration with the Germans.  Rather than handing the case over to a Court of 
Justice, however, the committee passed down a relatively lenient sentence: the men would be per-
manently banned from the publishing industry.287 
 The following week, on May 14, 1946, the committee shifted its attention toward Georges 
Lang.  The case against Lang was more difficult to build largely because the Germans had removed 
him from the factory in October 1940.  Despite Lang’s more limited role, Thirion blamed him for 
engineering the business’ Aryanization.  Thirion reserved his most venomous rhetoric not for the 
directors – Le Bris, Rime, and Dauvois – but for the owner Lang: 
Morally, I want to say here that he is most responsible. Men like 
Lang, through their personal selfishness and their desire to remain 
at the head of their business…did everything possible so that an 
agreement could exist between the provisional victors and the 
French population, all to maintain their business.288 
 
Lang’s actions, Thirion further insisted, had not stemmed solely from simple selfishness, but from 
a deeper political affinity for Hitler and the Nazi regime.  Multiple workers recalled comments 
made by Lang in 1936 during the wave of factory strikes that followed the election of the Popular 
Front government.  Denouncing the “Marxist rabble,” Lang had told his workers on more than one 
occasion that men like Hitler and Mussolini would never tolerate the events unfolding in France.  
“Hitler will come to restore order,” he declared.289  Rather than deny the comments outright, Lang 
instead emphasized that he had made them in 1936 and not in 1940 when Germany invaded France.  
Regardless of their timing, they were, at the very least, extremely off-color remarks, especially for 
a convert from Judaism.  To counter Thirion, Lang reminded the committee that his factory had 
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maintained contracts with French communist groups throughout the 1930s, proof that his actions 
under the occupation could not have been politically motivated.290 
 Rather than disrupt Thirion’s argument, Lang’s quick retorts led Thirion to make his larger 
point: that Lang had acted, above all else, from personal greed.  “[Collaboration] was just business” 
to him, insisted Thirion.  Lang’s actions had occurred to his own personal benefit while at the 
expense of France.  Over the years, various Frenchmen had referred to Lang derisively as “that 
Jew Lang,” a name he resented deeply.291 In Lang’s mind, he was a Frenchman first and foremost.  
He had acted during the occupation not as an acquisitive Jew but as a businessman taking back 
what was rightfully his.  What fault could others possibly find in his motives?  How could his 
patriotism be questioned, especially when one of his sons had fought and died to liberate France?  
“One of my sons was killed,” Lang shouted indignantly at Thirion, “They did not leave me time 
to mourn my son, an épuration committee accused me of collaboration. They tried to dirty me, to 
take my house.”  Thirion commended Lang’s son for his service to France but argued that the 
sacrifice of the son could never redeem the betrayal of the father: 
This is not the first family in France, that we know, where the father 
behaved badly and the son behaved well. In this war, this was per-
haps the most painful experience: seeing families torn apart.292 
 
Ultimately, Thirion argued, Lang had two morally acceptable options after the Germans first 
threatened to requisition his business: either abandon the factory to the Germans or dismantle the 
business completely.  Instead, in May 1941, Lang had chosen to cooperate with the Germans, 
agreeing to an Aryanization of the business and four “unacceptable” conditions which included 
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printing Signal magazine and funding a Gestapo workshop in the factory.  These harsh assertions 
led to a particularly testy exchange between the accuser and the accused at the May 14 hearing: 
Lang – Apart from my assumed political views, you reproach me for 
working to lift the requisition weighing down on my house? 
 
Thirion – Yes. 
 
Lang – The Germans commandeered my house! I opposed the will 
of the Germans, and they reproached me for resisting! I did every-
thing to drive the Germans the hell out of my house! I did everything 
to have the requisition lifted! 
 
Thirion – You come here giving us the same defense made by Pétain 
and Laval! The same arguments, the same background story.293 
 
By collaborating with the Germans, by printing propaganda works and funding the Gestapo’s in-
famous affiches des fusillés, Lang had dirtied his hands with the blood of murdered resistance 
members.294 This, in Thirion’s view, was an unforgivable crime. 
The business professionals judging Lang at the May 14 hearing, however, did not follow 
Thirion’s arguments and were, in any case, bound to view Lang’s actions in 1940 and 1941 with 
more sympathy than contempt.  Ruling that Lang could not be held responsible for the actions of 
his directors while in absentia from the company, the committee found Lang not guilty on the 
charge of collaboration.295  On May 27, the committee approved the return of Imprimerie Curial-
Archereau to Lang’s ownership.  The Imprimerie Curial-Archereau trial was more than just a con-
frontation between a resistor – Thirion – and a quasi-collaborator – Lang.  It was a confrontation 
between a communist worldview hardened by war and a hard-headed businessman whose views 
evolved as the German occupation tightened.  Ultimately, Thirion’s comparison of Lang to Pétain 
was unfair. 
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 Even from a distance of seven decades, reviewing the cases of André Zucca and Georges 
Lang is no simpler for a scholar today than it was for French contemporaries in 1944.  Undoubt-
edly, with both men, the instinct for self-preservation was stronger than the instinct to resist.  Alt-
hough he later came to regret his actions, Zucca accepted work for Signal in July 1941 and the 
perks that came with his position, which allowed him to resume his passion of photographing Paris.  
Georges Lang, the prideful entrepreneur, also accepted questionable conditions set by the Germans 
while placing his business back in trusted French hands.  Surely, the actions of these men could 
not be compared to those of notorious collaborators like Robert Brasillach or Jacques Doriot.  And 
yet, there remains the lingering question of what one labels self-preservation.  Was it a form of 
collaboration or accommodation? 
 Philippe Burrin, a prominent historian of the occupation, prefers not to use the term col-
laboration as he believes the term carries too much baggage.  The Germans were occupying France, 
he notes, and for any professional to avoid dealings with the Germans was impossible. Burrin 
instead prefers the term “accommodation.”  He distinguishes between three categories of economic 
accommodation: structural accommodation (completing German demands while providing essen-
tial services to French society), opportunist accommodation (driven by a desire to preserve per-
sonal interests), and political accommodation (professionals who shared similar ideological views 
with the Nazis).296 Using Burrin’s criteria, Zucca and Lang both fall under the category of oppor-
tunist accommodation.  For some historians, however, the term “accommodation” in the case of 
Zucca and Lang might seem too lenient.  István Deák, a scholar of European political history, 
defines accommodators as “people who tried to get by under foreign occupation, who hoped to 
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survive the war unscathed, and who wished to remain unpolitical.”297 The key word here is “un-
political.”  At the épuration committee hearings of the Imprimerie Curial-Archereau in May 1946, 
a local businessman described the actions of Lang and his directors as no more culpable than “the 
corner grocer selling his services to the Germans.”298 Such claims do not stand up to serious scru-
tiny, however.  Through publishing and photographing for Signal magazine, Lang and Zucca both 
contributed a great deal to the Nazi propaganda apparatus in France; the work these men agreed to 
carry out was, by its very nature, political. 
 How then should the historian assess the self-preservation of André Zucca and Georges 
Lang?  Reviewing the evidence available, one must conclude that both men fell on the collabora-
tionist end of the spectrum.  But the label “collaborator” fails to resolve the murkiness, the moral 
dilemmas, or the personal agony surrounding the actions both men took when confronted with the 
German occupation.  While similar in its manifestation, self-preservation was a phenomenon dis-
tinct from collaboration; it was willing action rooted not in animus or ill will, but in delusion and 
complacency.  Certainly, historians cannot celebrate such acts.  But historians should not condemn 
them outright either.  Not long after the end of the war, British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden 
remarked: “If one hasn’t been through all the horrors of an occupation by a foreign power, you 
have no right to pronounce upon what a country does which has been through all that.”299 
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Conclusion: Continuities 
 
 
 The last issue of Signal magazine rolled off the press at the Deutscher Verlag in Berlin 
sometime in late March or early April 1945.  Of course, by then, no one had been reading the 
magazine for some time.  With the Allied armies quickly approaching Berlin from east and west, 
those who had the ability to flee fled the city.  Editor-in-chief Giselher Wirsing departed on April 
1, moving south toward Bavaria.  By May, the war was over, and on May 25, the magistrate of the 
city of Berlin put the Ullstein family back in charge as custodians of the Deutscher Verlag.  Iron-
ically, in August, the publishing house was requisitioned once more, this time by the U.S. Military 
Government in Berlin, and required to print anti-Nazi propaganda.300 Once the largest publication 
in Europe, Signal magazine quickly faded from the European consciousness, but the men who 
worked for the magazine and the ideas it espoused lived on – some in prominence and others in 
obscurity. 
 Max Clauss, who joined Signal as an editor in 1940, fled Germany at war’s end and made 
his way to fascist Portugal, where he abandoned his lengthy career in politics and became a ship-
ping merchant in Lisbon.  Sometime in the 1950s, Clauss returned to Germany and continued 
living as a businessman.301  He became a representative for the Hannover Messe, a German indus-
trial fair, and, later in the 1960s, worked as a representative of industrial affairs at the European 
Commission, an institution that lives to the present-day as part of the European Union.302 In the 
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late 1960s, he acted as an advisor on foreign affairs to German Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger.  
Clauss died in 1988.303 
 Giselher Wirsing, Signal’s final chief editor, was never charged with war crimes (as his 
friend Walter Schellenberg was) by the Americans who arrested him.  He was eventually found 
guilty, however, of being a “follower” of the Nazi regime by a West German court in 1950  and 
fined 2,000 marks.  Wirsing appealed the fine to the Munich Court of Appeals, who agreed to 
reduce the fine to 500 marks because Wirsing “had favored an improvement of the situation of 
forced laborers and Jews” – never mind his long record of anti-Semitism and writings against 
“Judeo-capitalism.”304 Wirsing continued to come under criticism from Jewish groups throughout 
the postwar period.305 Despite his prominent role in the Nazi propaganda apparatus, however, 
Wirsing maintained a successful press career in post-war Germany.  In 1954, he became the editor-
in-chief of Christ und Welt, a conservative-evangelical publication that was the most widely-read 
newspaper in West Germany until the mid-1960s.306 There he remained until 1971, drawing atten-
tion from the U.S. State Department and the CIA for his editorials which regularly criticized U.S. 
policies toward Israel and Vietnam.307  Wirsing died in 1975. 
 André Zucca, the Paris correspondent for Signal, was permanently banned from working 
in the press by the decision of a civic court in November 1944.308 Along with his wife, Zucca left 
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Paris and settled in the commune of Dreux, some forty miles west of Paris.  There, Zucca changed 
his name to André Piernic and lived the rest of his life in relative obscurity.  He opened a photo 
studio in 1952, where he did family portraits as well as wedding, baptism, and communion pho-
tos.309 With little success, the business went bankrupt in 1965, and Zucca decided to return to his 
beloved Paris.  He lived in Montmartre until his death in 1973.310 
 Georges Lang, the Parisian publisher of Signal, was vindicated by an épuration committee 
in May 1946 and allowed to return to his business.  The government, however, had other ideas. 
That same month, representatives from the CGT (a major trade union confederation) had promised 
the workers of the Imprimerie Curial-Archereau that the factory would be nationalized.  The 
French Minister of Industrial Production, a communist named Marcel Paul, approved the plan, and 
a year-long legal battle ensued between Lang and the government over rights to the factory.  With 
the communists effectively forced from power in March 1947, the French State scrapped com-
munist plans to nationalize the factory, handing full reign back to Georges Lang.  He died a few 
weeks later, in April 1947.311 Lang’s surviving son Jacques took over the factory after his death 
and reverted it back to its original name, Imprimerie Georges Lang.  Over the next two decades, 
Jacques Lang continued to build on the success of his father, signing more major contracts for 
Imprimerie Georges Lang throughout the 1950s and 1960s, including with Time-Life Interna-
tional.312 
 A common thread runs through the wartime years of Clauss, Wirsing, Zucca, and Lang – 
a seeming ambivalence toward the Nazi regime.  Whatever their personal reservations, however, 
all four men agreed to work with the Nazis in some capacity.  In each case, personal reservations 
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on Nazism were overcome by a desire to continue professional and political endeavors uninhibited.  
In the case of Clauss and Wirsing more specifically, collaboration meant accepting Nazism and all 
of its crimes.  Ironically, those who contributed the most to the crimes of the Nazi regime paid the 
least for their “collaboration,” enjoying successful careers after the war.  Not so for the French.  
Lang died immediately after his business was restored to him, while Zucca lived the next three 
decades in poverty and obscurity. 
 
 Signal magazine was a singularly unique propaganda experience for its time – a piece of 
propaganda that was not national in its horizon but European.  Reviewing the magazine’s history 
offers scholars not only a better understanding of European collaboration, but also a unique win-
dow into the history of European integration and of twentieth-century Europe more broadly.  Its 
appeal to a European Community was not merely propaganda fluff, as some might dismiss it, but 
instead rooted in serious intellectual thought that predated the Nazi rise to power.  The Europe 
envisioned by Signal’s authors was not the one of liberalism and political freedom that exists to-
day, but one of anti-liberalism, nationalism, and authoritarianism – a vision that died with the end 
of the Second World War.  Although some scholars may dismiss the importance of such ideas for 
the future European Union, other scholars like the German historian Dieter Gosewinkel argue that 
“anti-liberal concepts of twentieth-century Europe [were] not the counterpoint to, but a part of the 
process of European integration.”313 Indeed, there are continuities between these competing vi-
sions of Europe, which both saw Europe as a distinct, peaceful entity defined against the Soviet 
Union and the United States.  
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The Second World War was a certain kind of collective experience for the peoples of Eu-
rope.  For the first time since Napoleon, most of continental Europe – from the Atlantic coast to 
the Russian steppes – had been brought under the heel of a single military power: Nazi Germany. 
Ironically, it was the humiliating defeat of so many European states at the hands of an upstart, 
revisionist and imperialist regime that forced Europeans to think in broader, continental terms ra-
ther than national ones. As editor Giselher Wirsing wrote in Signal in 1943, the questions facing 
the occupied-peoples were not a matter of saying “we Germans” or “we French,” but “we Euro-
peans.”  Ultimately, this vision would not be realized by those who had supported the Nazi regime 
like Wirsing, but by those who had opposed it. 
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